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COMPLEXITY THEORY, ADAPTATION, 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN† 
ABSTRACT 
 Recently, commentators have applied insights from complexity 
theory to legal analysis generally and to administrative law in 
particular. This Article focuses on one of the central problems that 
complexity theory addresses, the importance and mechanisms of 
adaptation within complex systems. In Part I, the Article uses three 
features of complex adaptive systems—emergence from self-assembly, 
nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions—and explores the 
extent to which they may add value as a matter of positive analysis to 
the understanding of change within legal systems. In Part II, the 
Article focuses on three normative claims in public law scholarship 
that depend explicitly or implicitly on notions of adaptation: that 
states offer advantages over the federal government because 
experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies 
should themselves become more experimentalist using the tool of 
adaptive management, and that administrative agencies should adopt 
collaborative mechanisms in policymaking. Using two analytic tools 
found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm and 
evolutionary game theory, the Article tests the extent to which these 
three normative claims are borne out. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not surprising that administrative law scholars, like legal 
scholars generally, have recently discovered complexity theory.1 Most 
theories of jurisprudence include a theory of change, and complexity 
theory has emerged over the past quarter century from attempts to 
shed light on patterns of change, many quite surprising, that occur 
across an exceptionally broad range of natural and artificial systems. 
Because competing explanations of American public institutions are 
1. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 
45 DUKE L.J. 849, 916–26 (1996) (using the metaphor of complex adaptive systems to model the 
administrative state and to call for fundamental doctrinal changes in the case law); J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the 
Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 806–09 (2003) (using the analogy of complex adaptive 
systems to explain system effects in the regulatory landscape). Professors Ruhl and Salzman 
claim there is a “recent explosion in [legal] scholarship employing complex systems theory.” Id. 
at 802. On the use of complexity theory by legal scholars in areas other than “core” 
administrative law, see, for example, Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996), which uses features of chaos theory to explain comparative 
corporate law, and Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 425 (1994), which proposes use of chaos theory to seek the development of a model 
of legislation richer than pluralism and public choice theory provide.  
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so diverse,2 one can understand the allure complexity theory 
promises: that new insights really could be gained by seeing in the 
administrative state the overarching tendencies of a complex, 
adaptive system. 
Nonetheless, for those not attuned to this emerging science, it 
must seem almost perverse to apply complexity theory to 
administrative law. After all, there already exist fairly dense bodies of 
work explaining administrative law alternatively in terms of interest-
group pluralism,3 civic republicanism,4 public choice economics,5 
substantive welfarism,6 and positive political theory.7 Now to seek 
explanatory power from an emerging discipline that focuses, among 
other things, on the study of chaos might appear merely to be asking 
for trouble. 
This Article asks whether complexity theory is worth the trouble 
by focusing on one of the central problems that the theory addresses: 
the importance and mechanisms of adaptation within complex 
systems. Focusing on adaptation promises payoffs on two fronts. First, 
as a matter of positive analysis, it raises the possibility that complexity 
theory may be capable of illuminating features of the legal 
landscape—seen from the perspective of change over time—more 
completely than other explanatory tools. Second, as a normative 
matter, focusing on the mechanisms of adaptation may improve the 
evaluation of claims that regulatory policymaking should itself be 
more explicitly experimentalist and adaptive.8 
2. See infra notes 3–7.
3. E.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669 (1975).
4. E.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).  
5. E.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000). 
6. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 31 (1999) (“Much of administrative law consists of an effort to ensure reason-
giving by regulatory agencies . . . .”); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The 
Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2004) 
(“Administrative law aspires to bring reason to agency policymaking.”).  
7. E.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); 
Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory 
Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller, A Positive Political Theory of 
Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory Specificity?, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 477 (1996).  
8. Claims for regulatory experimentation and adaptation, roughly speaking, tend to
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Part I of this Article considers whether theories of adaptation, 
especially those found in the complexity theory literature, might add 
value descriptively to legal doctrines, institutions, and analytic tools. 
In this part of the Article, I introduce complexity theory generally 
and focus on three aspects in which adaptation plays an important 
role: emergence from self-assembly, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to 
initial conditions. 
Part II of the Article focuses on three normative claims that 
either explicitly or implicitly depend for their support on notions of 
adaptation. The three claims are, respectively, that states offer 
advantages in policy formation over the federal government because 
experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies 
should themselves become more experimentalist by using the tool of 
“adaptive management,”9 and that administrative agencies should 
adopt “collaborative” mechanisms capable of enlisting regulatory 
stakeholders in problem-solving partnerships with regulatory 
reflect three different types of administrative law reform projects. The first reflects a 
devolutionary project based on the premise that more localized decisionmakers will experiment 
with policymaking because they must react to competing and competitive pressures among local 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 284 (1998) (arguing for local policymaking as more 
responsive and innovative in light of greater experimentalism at the local decisionmaking level); 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1916 (2001) (“The leading scholarship on federalism describes the value of 
local participation in utilitarian and dignitary terms, associating political action at the local level 
with experimental and improved policymaking . . . .”). The second reflects a substantive 
neoclassical interest in attaining efficient outcomes in policymaking by use of experimental 
approaches to explore uncertainty. See, e.g., John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The 
Missouri River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80 
NEB. L. REV. 816, 834–60 (2001) (analyzing the treatment of adaptive management as a 
decisionmaking strategy in the “Master Manual” for the Missouri River adopted by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers). The third reflects a proceduralist interest in improving stakeholder 
participation, in part by allowing for provisional approaches. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1997) 
(observing that provisionalism requires deliberation so as to avoid surprise to stakeholders). 
The categorization of administrative law into neoclassical and proceduralist camps is taken from 
Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 241, 243–88 (2000), which criticizes this categorization. 
9. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 943 (2003) 
(“Conservation ecologists and natural resource managers assert that integrated management of 
complex ecosystems requires an iterative and adaptive management approach.”); J.B. Ruhl, 
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the 
Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 996 (1997) 
(noting that adaptive management establishes that a “failure to experiment . . . would be folly”). 
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agencies.10 To evaluate these claims from the perspective of 
complexity theory, I draw on insights from two mechanisms of 
adaptation found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm 
and evolutionary game theory. 
I. COMPLEXITY THEORY AS A DESCRIPTIVE
TOOL: APPLICATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A theory of change is central to understanding the science of 
complexity. Although I elaborate further, for present purposes it is 
sufficient that complexity theory is understood to involve “the study 
of many actors and their interactions.”11 Part of the theory’s allure is 
that it operates on a very high level of generality. Thus, the actors can 
be “atoms, fish, people, organizations, or nations.”12 And their 
interactions can include “attraction, combat, mating, communication, 
trade, partnership, or rivalry.”13 Because the theory operates at such a 
general level, it has been used to describe such features of natural 
systems as evolutionary selection14 and climate change,15 as well as 
features of such artificial systems as the economy,16 government,17 and 
computer networks.18 For the same reason, there are elements of 
10. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 8, at 22 (“Collaborative governance seeks to respond to
the litany of criticisms about the quality, implementability, and legitimacy of rule making by 
reorienting the regulatory enterprise around joint problem solving . . . .”). 
11. ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 3 (1997). 
12. Id; see also Ruhl, supra note 1, at 875 (“Chaos, emergence, and catastrophe can be
explained using the examples of snowflakes, snow, and avalanches.”). 
13. AXELROD, supra note 11, at 3.
14. See ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 117–18 (1999) (using natural 
selection as an example of a complex adaptive system, but also noting that natural selection has 
disadvantages when compared to other methods of adaptation).  
15. See JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 43–44 (1998) (noting
that, even though “[c]haos theory is often cited as an explanation for the difficulty of predicting 
weather and other complex phenomena,” in the short term there can be useful, predictive 
models of weather prediction); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, 
and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 568 (2004) (“[O]ur current 
understanding suggests that climate change may represent just such a chaotic system.”). 
16. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 29 (noting that Adam Smith’s concept of the 
“hidden hand” in economics reflects what modern theorists would recognize as emergent 
properties of a complex system).  
17. See infra notes 103–13 and accompanying text (discussing claims that complexity theory 
offers advantages over public choice analysis in explaining legislation and the legislative 
process). 
18. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at xiii (noting that computer scientists studying
918 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:913
overlap between complexity theory and explanatory tools developed 
in other disciplines such as evolutionary theory in biology and game 
theory in economics.19 
Of particular interest to the science of complexity are the ways 
that interactions cause actors to adapt, and how even minor 
adaptations can echo recursively throughout a system, leading to 
outcomes that might not have been predicted, or predictable, by 
“linear” mathematical methodologies.20 Indeed, because such 
outcomes sometimes lead to catastrophic, chaotic upheavals,21 
complexity theory is often described as, or defined to include, “chaos” 
theory.22 Complexity theory studies complex adaptive systems23 and 
asserts not only that they can reflect nonlinear properties24 but that 
such properties can play an essential role in the sustainability and 
success of some of these systems.25 
There are three features of complexity theory that are worth 
drawing out to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses that 
distributed and network-mediated computing are probing deeper questions of “what it takes to 
make systems of many agents work together and grow”). 
19. Id. at xiii–xiv.
20. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152–54 (2003) (stating that nonlinearity 
is a distinctive feature of complex adaptive systems); Ruhl, supra note 1, at 878–79 (arguing that 
complexity theory “demolishes the centuries-old myth of predictability and time-symmetric 
determinism, and with it any idea of a clockwork universe” (quoting PETER COVENEY & 
ROGER HIGHFIELD, THE ARROW OF TIME 37 (1990))). 
21. See Farber, supra note 20, at 153: 
This attribute is known as “chaos” and involves extreme sensitivity to initial 
conditions, so that immeasurable variations in the current state of affairs can lead 
over time to arbitrarily large divergences in eventual outcomes. Such systems also 
produce a characteristic distribution of outcomes: “a high frequency of small 
fluctuations, punctuated by the occasional large shift in system conditions.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Ruhl, supra note 9, at 952). 
22. Id; see also Roe, supra note 1, at 642 (stating that the science of chaos involves systems
in which “small changes in the original position make for very large changes in outcome”). 
23. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 7 (using the phrase “Complex Adaptive
System” to refer to systems that “contain agents or populations that seek to adapt”). 
24. See id. at 14 (“What makes prediction especially difficult in these settings is that the
forces shaping the future do not add up in a simple, systemwide manner. Instead, their effects 
include nonlinear interactions.”). Not all nonlinear systems are complex systems; the standard 
exponential growth model, for example, is nonlinear but not “complex” as that term is typically 
used in the complexity literature. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Introduction to COMPLEXITY IN 
ECONOMICS, at x (J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. ed., 2004). 
25. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 857, 860, 866 (referring to a blend of features, including
nonlinearity, that can lead to sustainability and adaptiveness in a system). But see AXELROD & 
COHEN, supra note 14, at 18–19 (noting that not all complex adaptive systems necessarily 
achieve improved performance). 
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complexity theory may bring to the study of change in legal systems 
generally and to administrative law reform in particular. These are: 
(1) emergence from self-assembly, (2) sensitivity to initial conditions,
and (3) nonlinearity.
A. Self-Assembly, Emergence, and Evolutionary Properties in Law
Well before complexity theory arrived, theories of legal change
reflected the impact of evolution as first articulated by Charles 
Darwin in 1859 in The Origin of Species.26 As Professor Herbert 
Hovenkamp observes about Darwin’s theory of evolution, “Only a 
few ideas in intellectual history have been so powerful and captivating 
that they have overflowed the brim of the discipline from which they 
came and spilled over into everything else.”27 
But not every legal theory that references Darwin or that calls 
itself “evolutionary” really is based on a central mechanism that 
operates, as does natural selection in Darwin’s theory, to explain how 
adaptation occurs. Thus, as Professor Donald Elliott explains,28 
influential nineteenth-century theories of legal evolution such as 
those articulated by Friedrich Karl von Savigny29 and Sir Henry James 
Sumner Maine30 generally were vague about the mechanisms that 
caused law to evolve31 and were at times “hopelessly metaphorical 
and unscientific.”32 Even the so-called “Social Darwinists,” led by 
political theorist Herbert Spencer in his widely influential book Social 
Statics,33 may be said merely to have poached from Darwin a concept 
26. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION:
OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (Castle Books ed., 
2004) (1859).  
27. Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645, 645
(1985). 
28. See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
38 (1985). 
29. FREDERICK VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION ON OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (Lawbook Exchange ed., 2002) (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831).  
30. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY 
OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (William S. Hein & Company ed., 1984) 
(1861).  
31. See Elliott, supra note 28, at 46 (“[L]ike Savigny, Maine describes patterns of legal
change without paying much attention to the processes that produce them. [He] asserts, for 
example, that there is a natural progression from heroic kingship to aristocracy, but does not tell 
us how or why.”). 
32. Id. at 43 (speaking of Savigny).
33. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (Robert Shackelford Publisher ed., 1995) (1892).
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of fitness34 without offering a scientifically defensible mechanism to 
explain how the fitness that they envisioned would necessarily come 
about.35 
The essential features of Darwinism are known to complexity 
theory as self-assembly and emergence. As Professor Elliott explains: 
[T]he peculiar appeal of evolutionary models arises in part from
their power to explain “the achievement of purposive or ends-
guided processes through a mechanism involving blind, stupid,
unforesightful elements.” One reason Darwin’s theory of the origin
of the species was a watershed in intellectual history was its ability to
explain complex structures in nature without invoking design
choices by a Creator.36
When mechanisms of self-assembly lead to properties of a system that 
are not shared by its constituent parts, these properties are called 
emergent.37 Thus, “no single neuron has consciousness, but the human 
brain does . . . as an emergent property.”38 The emergence of quite 
powerful properties can arise from the interaction of multiple actors, 
especially when there is a mechanism of selection designed to 
34. It was Herbert Spencer, not Charles Darwin, who coined the phrase “survival of the
fittest.” RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 39 (George 
Braziller, Inc. 1959) (1944).  
35. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 666 (“The evolutionary theory contained in the first
edition of Social Statics was heavily Lamarckian, with God an active participant in the 
process.”); see also Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1135 n.47 (1997) (observing that it is 
reproduction, not individual survival as emphasized by Spencer, that is important to the 
mechanism of biological evolution). Based on this theoretically weak starting point, the Social 
Darwinists built sweeping claims that human progress depended on relentless competition 
among individuals that would weed out the weak and the sick, free from interference by the 
state. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 667–70 (“Spencer viewed the state as an inefficient and 
potentially harmful instrument. It created an illusion of cooperation between individuals when 
in fact none existed . . . . Society survived only when every person had maximum freedom with a 
minimum of restrictions.”) And it was, of course, to Spencer’s assertions that Justice Holmes 
directed his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 48 (1905), when he stated that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” id. at 75 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).  
36. Elliott, supra note 28, at 54–55 (quoting Donald T. Campbell, Variation and Selective
Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution, in SOCIAL CHANGES IN DEVELOPING AREAS: A 
REINTERPRETATION OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 19, 26–27 (Herbert Barringer et al. eds., 
1965)). 
37. See HOLLAND, supra note 15, at 121–22 (describing emergence as interactions resulting
in a system characterized by behavior that “cannot be obtained by summing the behaviors of its 
constituent parts”).  
38. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 15. 
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separate successful individuals or strategies. This is so whether the 
mechanism is the natural selection process that Darwin described or a 
manmade selection mechanism that might be found in such an 
artificial system as an economy.39 Professors Robert Axelrod and 
Michael Cohen make just this point: “Adam Smith’s 1776 description 
of a market introduced some of the key concepts of complex systems, 
including the notion of a hidden hand and market clearing, concepts 
that would now be called emergent properties of the system.”40 
True evolutionary theories of legal change reflect this emphasis 
on self-assembly, selection, and emergence—and indeed depend on 
these features for their intellectual strength. Perhaps the most widely 
noted examples of such theories were the “selective re-litigation” 
models of the common law, developed in the 1970s by Professors Paul 
Rubin41 and George Priest.42 These theories postulated that the 
common law was efficient not because judges consciously adopted 
efficient doctrines, but because even when doctrines were inefficient 
and judges made mistakes, people suffering under the inefficiency of 
such rules would have a greater incentive to litigate and relitigate 
them.43 Because the system asymmetrically selects inefficient rules for 
litigation, the Rubin/Priest models claimed that inefficient rules were 
more likely eventually to be modified or abandoned, causing 
efficiency to emerge.44 The Rubin/Priest models drew a fairly large 
critical literature challenging some of the models’ assumptions and 
specifications.45 But for purposes of this Article, the significant point 
39. See id. at 7 (describing how complex systems change strategies by means of selection).
40. Id. at 29. Evolutionary biologist Stephan Jay Gould makes a similar observation, albeit
without consciously invoking complexity theory, when he observes, “I believe that the theory of 
natural selection should be viewed as an extended analogy—whether conscious or unconscious 
on Darwin’s part I do not know—to the laissez faire economics of Adam Smith.” STEPHAN JAY 
GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 66 (1980). 
41. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
42. George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
43. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
595, 601 (1997) (“So if judges err—including because the internal selection system of legal 
doctrines is ‘wrong’ . . . then people in the community . . . are going to keep coming back to the 
courts to test that rule, and that rule is more likely to be modified or abandoned eventually.”); 
see also Elliott, supra note 28, at 62–71 (discussing economic theories of legal evolution).  
44. Elliott, supra note 43, at 600–01. 
45. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and
Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 910 n.27 (1998) 
(discussing the Rubin/Priest models and the literature that challenges them); Robert D. Cooter, 
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New 
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of the models is that they reflect how properties from complexity 
theory involving selection, self-assembly, and emergence might be 
used to explain features of the legal system. 
An even more recent application of these features was proposed 
by Professor Jason Johnston to evaluate the efficiency of regulatory 
cost-benefit analysis and statutory design.46 Johnston’s thesis is 
especially intriguing because it reaches a nonobvious result: that 
statutes requiring administrative agencies to employ cost-benefit 
analysis may actually lead to the emergence of inefficiency. Like the 
selective relitigation models, this outcome is driven by the unintended 
operation of asymmetrical selection pressures. Specifically, Johnston 
analyzes the effect on agency behavior of the choice by regulated 
firms to challenge agency action either through lobbying (marshalling 
political pressure on the agency to rescind a proposed rule)47 or 
through litigation (seeking judicial reversal of an agency’s final rule 
under the Administrative Procedure Act).48 Johnston compares the 
effects of these challenges on agency decisions promulgated under 
“benefits” statutes (which direct an agency to maximize a benefit such 
as health or environmental purity without cost-benefit calculations) 
with agency decisions promulgated under “cost-benefit” statutes 
(which include a judicially enforceable requirement that the costs of 
agency action not exceed the benefits).49 Johnston posits that firms 
choosing whether to lobby or to litigate will have either low 
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law] 
(“[S]elective-litigation pressure and blind evolution fail to explain the level of efficiency 
observed in common law.”); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the 
Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (1980) (finding that blind 
evolution only moderately influences legal improvements); Elliott, supra note 28, at 62–71 
(surveying the critical literature on economic theories of legal evolution); Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 594–96 (1992) (discussing “non-
motivational” accounts of selective litigation pressures); Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law 
and Economics: Why More Economics Is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 804 n.75 (1996) 
(discussing the selective litigation process). 
46. Jason Scott Johnston, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002). 
47. Id. at 1358.
48. Id. at 1359.
49. See Matthew D. Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Comment on Johnston, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1430–32 (2002) (summarizing Johnston’s 
distinction between “benefits” statutes and “cost-benefit” statutes). 
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compliance costs or high compliance costs,50 and that generally the 
agency does not really know the true value of these costs.51 
Professor Johnston’s key insight is that, under benefits statutes, 
firms will signal their true compliance costs by the efforts they expend 
on lobbying or litigation, and that agencies, calculating whether it is 
worth agency resources to fight such efforts, will implicitly sort their 
rules by a shadow type of cost-benefit test and proceed only with 
those rules that promise regulatory benefits in excess of the agency’s 
costs.52 As law professor Matthew Adler states in analyzing Johnston’s 
model, “Why does the ‘sorting’ scenario occur? It occurs because of 
the effect that firm lobbying and litigation have on the agency’s 
expected net benefit from enacting the directive, and because high-
cost firms have a greater incentive to lobby and litigate than do low-
cost firms.”53 In contrast, under cost-benefit statutes, agencies factor 
into their decisionmaking the chance that reviewing courts will err in 
processing cost-benefit arguments; under certain scenarios this leads 
agencies either to forego adopting regulations that are truly cost-
benefit justified or, contrariwise, to promulgate regulations that in 
reality are not cost-benefit justified and find them upheld by mistake-
prone courts.54 
Although the early returns on the validity of Professor 
Johnston’s model are promising,55 it is, of course, not yet known 
whether the model will withstand further empirical investigation and 
analytic scrutiny any better than did the Rubin/Priest models. But 
50. Johnston, supra note 46, at 1353–55.
51. See id. at 1366–68 (discounting what firms merely “tell” agencies about compliance
expenditures as “cheap” talk). 
52. Adler, supra note 49, at 1432–33.
53. Id. at 1433.
54. See id. at 1436 (“Because of firm lobbying and litigation, a statute that not only
instructs the agency to apply a cost-benefit test, but also makes [cost benefit analysis] judicially 
reviewable, might nonetheless fail to induce the agency to sort between welfare-enhancing and 
welfare-reducing litigation.”(emphasis added)). 
55. See id. at 1429 (making numerous analytical suggestions but nonetheless calling
Professor Johnston’s model a “substantial contribution” to the positive political theory of 
regulation); see also Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism 
and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851, 871 (2003) (referencing Professor 
Johnston’s article as shifting the debate on cost-benefit analysis “more on its institutional 
implementation, a topic that lends itself to more reasoned and constructive debate than the 
earlier battles over the morality of the technique”); Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based 
Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1453, 1470–71 (2002) (suggesting that Professor Johnston’s analysis may produce even 
stronger results in more “political” versions of positive political theory). 
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Johnston has revealed an aspect of the legal system in general and 
identified a hidden debate over cost-hidden analysis in particular that 
has heretofore escaped attention by utilizing insights on self-
assembly, selection, and emergence.56 
B. Sensitivity to Initial Conditions: A Broader Reading of
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and Its Applicability to the
“Adaptationist’s Fallacy”
Professor Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem”57 is
typically offered to show that legislators’ preferences in a democracy 
cannot coherently be combined to produce a stable body of law that 
reflects the public’s welfare.58 Arrow posited a voting “system” 
comprised of representatives with rationally transitive preferences in 
which decisions are made purely by majority vote.59 Professors Daniel 
Farber and Philip Frickey use the example of three legislators who 
must choose among three states in which to locate a federal facility: 
Legislator 1 prefers Texas over Illinois, and Illinois over Florida; 
Legislator 2 prefers Illinois over Florida, and Florida over Texas; and 
Legislator 3 prefers Florida over Texas, and Texas over Illinois.60 In 
56. It is worth noting, however, that in an article published several years before Professor
Johnston’s article, Professor Daniel Farber speculates on ways in which asymmetrical 
compliance costs could cause implementation of an agency rule to be felt first by firms with low 
compliance costs, and at least delayed for firms with high costs. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking 
Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316 (1999) (“It is at least plausible that the most rapid compliance will 
involve sources with lower compliance costs or high environmental impacts, while the greatest 
delays will occur for sources with high costs or low impacts.”). Although Professor Farber 
neither identifies nor specifies a mechanism by which this asymmetry might affect the ultimate 
distribution of costs and benefits, as does Professor Johnston, it is significant that Farber 
appreciated the same point made in the text above: that a legal doctrine (cost-benefit analysis) 
can be affected by mechanisms of adaptation. See id. at 317 (“[I]t is at least clear that an 
assessment of existing regulations cannot ignore the dynamics of the implementation process.”). 
57. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 38–39 (1991) (introducing Arrow’s Theorem and noting that a summary of 
Arrow’s work is found in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 384–99 (1989)). 
58. See id. at 39 (“Arrow’s Theorem presents a conceptual barrier to combining individual
preferences into some overall measure of social welfare.”). 
59. Transitivity reflects the minimum rationality such that “[i]f society prefers outcome A
to outcome B and outcome B to outcome C, then society prefers A over C.” Id. at 38. For 
further discussion of transitivity in economic analysis, see Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming 
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
562, 590–91, 598–603 (1992) (explaining, and critiquing, the use of transitivity in economic 
analysis involving incommensurable goods). 
60. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 39.
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the parlance of complexity theory, as these actors interact through a 
series of votes, adaptation occurs, producing nonobvious results. 
Thus, if the three actors first choose between Texas and Illinois, with 
the winning location paired against Florida: 
Legislators 1 and 3 prefer Texas, so it wins the first round, [in round 
two] legislators 2 and 3 combine to pick Florida over Texas . . . [but 
if there’s a round three, legislators 1 and 2 combine to pick Illinois 
over Florida, which leads to a round four where legislators 1 and 3 
recombine to pick Texas over Illinois] so we’re right back where we 
started . . . trapped in a revolving door with no exit.61 
Although the literature on complex adaptive systems does not 
typically cite the Impossibility Theorem, the economic and social 
theory literature sometimes classifies it as part of a family of 
observations known as “chaos theorems.”62 
Scholars have invoked the Impossibility Theorem to make many 
points. It has been used to caution against democratic voting systems 
because legislative “cycling,” the back-where-we-started feature 
highlighted by Professors Farber and Frickey, means that any 
particular legislative choice may not actually reflect the stable 
preferences of a majority.63 For the same reason, it has been used in 
administrative law scholarship to justify Congress’s delegation of 
rulemaking powers to agencies as a welfare-enhancing way to avoid 
legislative cycling.64 
61. Id.
62. See P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
71–82 (1986) (positing that Arrow’s Theorem is important “because it compels us to 
acknowledge that [social preference] paradoxes can prevail with any preference aggregation 
mechanism”), cited in FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 40 n.2; Jim Chen, The Mystery and 
the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 MO. L. REV. 281, 299 (1994) (referring to “chaos theorem” 
as a corollary to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem); David Luban, Social Choice Theory as 
Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 542 (1996) (discussing Professors Richard McKelvey and 
Norman Schofield’s use of “closely related [chaos] theorems whose importance may eclipse that 
of Arrow’s Theorem itself”). 
63. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 167 (1982) 
(highlighting the ineradicability of strategic voting in all voting systems). See also FARBER & 
FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 40.  
64. See William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem,
Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 
948, 952 (“[R]elaxing Arrow’s nondictatorship condition is of some appeal . . . . Such a 
dictatorship is today established, in the person of bureaucrats, by open-ended delegations of 
legislative power to agencies.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 595 
(1995) (book review) (“Some scholars have invoked the Arrow Impossibility Theorem to 
926 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:913
But the Impossibility Theorem also illustrates a feature of 
complexity theory that might have even broader application in legal 
analysis: that outcomes in some systems are extremely sensitive to 
initial conditions, a phenomenon related to path dependence.65 
Taking Professor Farber and Frickey’s example of the three 
legislators, if the location of the federal facility was chosen solely after 
the first vote, rather than via an endless series of votes, then the final 
choice would be Texas. And, although this choice could be criticized 
normatively as merely an artifact of the new voting procedure, the 
choice can also be used descriptively for the more general insight that 
outcomes can be extremely sensitive to initial conditions, with large 
differences in outcomes attributable to very small changes in the 
original position.66 This feature of Arrow’s Theorem is often observed 
among complex adaptive systems, with perhaps the most commonly 
known example (the “butterfly effect”) involving weather patterns so 
complex that “a butterfly flapping its wings today on one side of the 
globe could induce a torrential downpour next week on the other side 
of the globe.”67 
The sensitivity of complex systems to initial starting points has 
important implications for legal theory, especially in its ability to 
highlight the “adaptationist fallacy”68—the Panglossian idea that 
everything that exists must be fit (in the evolutionary sense) simply to 
have survived the competitive pressures of adaptation. Thus, biology 
is often (mis)understood to mean, as Herbert Spencer incorrectly 
explained it, that evolutionary pressures result in survival only of 
support broad congressional delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, relying 
on technocrat expertise to replace the irrationality of democratic decisionmaking.”). 
65. See Roe, supra note 1, at 641–43 (noting overlap between path dependence and
sensitivity to initial conditions).  
66. See JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1987) (“Tiny differences in
input could quickly become overwhelming differences in output—a phenomenon given the 
name ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions.’”); Roe, supra note 1, at 642 (“Some 
phenomena are extremely sensitive to initial conditions: small changes in the original position 
make for very large changes in outcome.”). 
67. Roe, supra note 1, at 642 (citing GLEICK, supra note 66, at 8). But see HOLLAND, supra
note 15, at 43–44 (noting that, as for day-to-day changes in the weather, butterfly effects can be 
negligible in relation to huge movements of air masses, making relatively accurate predictions 
possible in the short term, when “chaos theory has little relevance”). 
68. The term is used in Elliott, supra note 43, at 598–99. See also Stephen J. Gould &
Richard C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of 
the Adaptationist Programme, 205 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON BIOLOGICAL SCI. 581, 581–98 
(1979) (critiquing the adaptionist programme of understanding evolution). 
2005] COMPLEXITY THEORY 927
“the” fittest.69 Properly understood, of course, in biology it is not 
unusual for there to be numerous solutions to evolutionary 
pressures.70 In law and economics, Professor Mark Roe criticizes a 
“paradigm of Darwinian survival of the fittest,”71 that holds “[w]hat 
survives is presumptively efficient: if it were inefficient, the practice, 
the law, or the custom would be challenged by its more efficient 
competitors [and] . . . the more efficient practice or law [would] 
prosper, while its less efficient competitors wither and die.”72 In an 
influential article, Professor Roe uses the property of path 
dependence stemming from sensitivity to initial conditions to 
suggest that today’s legal forms might reflect, instead of efficiency, a 
culture’s unique political and cultural institutions, chaotic chance 
events, or the fact that sunk costs make inefficient forms 
regrettable but not worth changing.73 After offering case studies of 
comparative corporate and bankruptcy law, Professor Roe notes that 
descriptive analysis incorporating path-dependence can offer 
advantages over traditional law and economics models in terms of 
better explaining “why we have the institutions we have,”74 for better 
evaluating the continuation of an institution or legal rule that arose 
“to resolve a problem that is irrelevant today,”75 and for highlighting 
generally that not all current arrangements are necessarily optimal.76 
69. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (contrasting Spencer and Darwin).
70. Elliott, supra note 43, at 598–99 (noting that, unlike Herbert Spencer’s bastardized
notion of survival of “the” fittest, in biology “it is very rare that there is only one unique 
solution that will survive. . . . Most of the time . . . . [t]here is a very broad range of 
characteristics that can survive and exist within the population”). 
71. Roe, supra note 1, at 642. 
72. Id. at 641.
73. Id. at 646–53. Professor Roe’s article has engendered a spirited debate over path
dependence and adaptationism in corporate law. See, e.g., Lucien Arye Bebchuk & Mark. J. 
Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
127 (1999) (discussing the role of path dependence in corporate ownership structures); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 64 (1999) (critiquing the traditional “Berle 
and Mean” paradigm and noting that “Professor Roe’s work has been the dominant influence in 
this field”); Craig LaChance, Note, Nature v. Nurture: Evolution, Path Dependence and 
Corporate Governance, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L 279, 287–88 (2001) (noting that Professor 
Roe’s piece challenged the conventional “Berle and Mean” paradigm that “corporate structure 
in other countries would inevitably evolve into something similar to the U.S. system”).  
74. Roe, supra note 1, at 658. 
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Other legal scholars are also beginning to use the 
insights of sensitivity to initial conditions and path dependence 
to analyze particular areas of statutory and administrative 
law such as securities law,77 environmental regulation,78 and banking 
law.79 And these insights have been used more broadly to describe 
features of the administrative state such as the overaccumulation of 
rules80 and “lock-in” effects.81 To be sure, these efforts are relatively 
new, and it is too early to confirm the strength of their contribution to 
descriptive analysis. But there are at least indications that complexity 
theory in this regard promises improvements, if not a more robust 
model, than traditional law and economics models stressing the 
adaptive power of competition alone. 
C. Nonlinearity: Adding Context to the Logic of Collective Action
Most theories of jurisprudence contain a theory of change.82 And
one of the strongest features of some economic models of law is that 
they attempt to stipulate plausible mechanisms to explain the shape 
of existing law as well as the direction of legal change.83 In his 1965 
77. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1589–91 (1999) 
(concluding that, given the costs, insider trading regulation should be permitted to continue 
down its path-dependent course with only some modifications).  
78. See, e.g., Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental
Law and Public Health Protection, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363, 10,365 (2002) 
(“Environmental health regulation is path-dependent: actions taken now affect the nature of 
actions taken later.”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1334 
n.458 (1995) (“One wonders in light of the history of securities regulation how much the heavily
substantive approach of contemporary environmental law owes to path dependence concerning
the choices of original legal strategies rather than to deliberative choice.”).
79. See, e.g., Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice over 
Public Policy, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 16 (1998) (“The conflict between [the Federal Reserve 
and the Comptroller of the Currency] appears to be the path dependent result of historical 
policy decisions affecting branching in the United States.”). 
80. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 1, at 818 (“Over time, the accretion of rules will
present more regulatory decision nodes, which will add to the path dependence of present 
regulatory positions, and will therefore limit the options for new rules.”). 
81. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 817
(1998) (“Although much of the literature has concerned technological development—ranging 
from typewriter keyboards to computer operating systems to light bulbs—lock-in may apply 
with equal force to . . . law itself. Regulatory regimes—legal or extralegal—provide obvious 
analogies to technological standards.” (footnotes omitted)). 
82. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 646 (“Today every theory of jurisprudence worth
contemplating incorporates a theory of change.”). 
83. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The
Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 450 (2004) 
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book The Logic of Collective Action,84 Professor Mancur Olson 
articulated an economic theory of interest groups that has been 
widely influential in public law.85 The key insight is well-known: 
smaller groups will have an easier time organizing and exerting 
influence on public decisionmakers than will larger groups, such as 
the public at large, because legislation that benefits everyone 
encourages members of the public to free ride on what they perceive 
to be the efforts of the much larger group of beneficiaries.86 Given this 
logic, the prospect of public interest decisionmaking recedes as 
politics becomes dominated by better-organized special interest 
groups.87 This insight has been quite influential in administrative law, 
leading some commentators to claim that, to avoid agency capture by 
special interests, “[C]ongress turned to increasingly specific statutory 
provisions in environmental legislation and to the use of agency-
forcing devices such as statutory deadlines and statutorily defined 
‘default’ rules that took effect in the absence of agency action.”88 
As a theory of change, Professor Olson’s logic undoubtedly 
gained much of its power because it supplied a mechanism rather 
than a mere metaphor. The mechanism—the relative organizational 
superiority of special interest groups—rested on plausible 
(arguing that “[t]hrough its ex ante perspective, the functional school focuses on mechanism 
design issues to explain the origins of law”); Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and All 
That—A Review of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law by Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272, 295 (1992) (“Landes and Posner’s economic 
theory of tort law recognizes the need for a ‘causal mechanism’ to explain why judicial and 
legislative lawmakers do what they do.”). But see Wil Waluchow, In Pursuit of Pragmatic Legal 
Theory: The Practice of Principle by Jules Coleman, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 125, 138 
(2002) (book review) (“Coleman’s principal objection to viewing economic theories as causal-
functional explanations is that they post no plausible causal mechanism to explain why the rules 
and practices of tort law are structured to achieve economic goals.”). 
84. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  
85. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 71 (2003) (“The Logic of Collective Action has for decades supplied the logic 
of public-policy analysis. . . . [and] dominate[d] public-policy analysis and public policy itself 
across a host of regulatory domains . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
86. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 23 (discussing the free-rider problem and its
organizational difficulties for large groups) (citing OLSON, supra note 84, at 132–34). 
87. See id. (“Thus, if Olson is correct, politics should be dominated by ‘rent-seeking’ special 
interest groups.”). 
88. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and
Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 409–10 (1993) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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assumptions and had at least some empirical support.89 In that sense, 
it offered the allure of a principled means of making more accurate 
predictions of legal change than had an earlier literature on “interest-
group pluralism” that offered only the indeterminate metaphor of 
finding in legislation an “equilibrium” among competing forces.90 Yet, 
despite its intellectual appeal, The Logic of Collective Action has 
faced mounting challenges from those scholars who would replace 
some of Olson’s core assumptions.91 Some of these critics understand 
individuals not solely as the rational, self-interested, calculating 
beings postulated by Professor Olson but as “emotional/moral 
reciprocators” capable of altruism.92 Others point to empirical 
evidence that both legislators and voters are motivated by ideology 
more than by calculations of material self-interest.93 
This is what one might call the conventional administrative law 
debate. And the conventional debate helps to frame a feature of 
complexity theory that may prove useful in legal analysis. Complexity 
theory is strongly antireductionist.94 It claims that the behavior of 
complex adaptive systems cannot be explained in a mechanical, 
89. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 24 (“[A]s the political science literature
indicates, special interest groups do appear to play a major role in the legislative process.”).  
90. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288 (1962) (“Many modern 
students of pressure-group phenomena seem to rely on [there being an] ‘equilibrium.’”); EARL 
LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT LEGISLATION 36 (1952) 
(“What may be called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given 
moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to 
weight in their favor.”).  
91. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 27–33 (noting the different types of
challenges that have been brought); see also infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.  
92. See ALEXANDER J. FIELD, ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED?: THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND THE ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 21–25 (2004) 
(arguing that humans show altruism by failing to harm other humans whom they do not know); 
Kahan, supra note 85, at 71–74 (“Olson’s Logic [of Collective Action] is false. In collective-
action settings, individuals adopt not a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more 
emotionally nuanced reciprocal one.”).  
93. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 797 (2004)
(“[D]espite empirical studies showing ideology to be a better predictor of legislative votes than 
economics, public choice ignores the ideology of politicians and bureaucrats.” (footnote 
omitted)); Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern 
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 335 (2002) 
(“Participants in social movements are even more obviously motivated by ideology, particularly 
in those movements that are unconnected with their personal well-being.”).  
94. Certainly one of the most forceful advocates of this view, as applied to administrative
law in particular, is law professor J.B. Ruhl, who has found in complexity theory a “[w]ake-up 
[c]all for [l]egal [r]eductionism.” See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 849.
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“linear” way—such as might be promised by the application of a 
reductionist insight such as Olson’s or even by the promise of 
interest-group pluralism to find a recurring “equilibrium” in 
legislation.95 Instead, complex adaptive systems reflect the more 
unpredictable properties of nonlinearity.96 Perhaps the most common 
use of this observation in the legal literature is reflected in citations 
by environmental law scholars to evidence that ecosystems are no 
longer modeled simply as reflecting the “balance” of nature or as 
reflecting the predictable, evolutionary succession of “stages” of 
ecological development.97 Instead, “ecology is following physics as it 
owes much to chaos theory. Non-equilibrium ecology rejects the 
vision of a balance of nature. Change and instability are the new 
constants.”98  
Professor Daniel Farber notes that complex adaptive systems, 
even those with basic interactions that are well understood in precise 
equations, demonstrate overall behavior characterized by 
mathematical “power laws” that do not follow “familiar bell-curve” 
statistical distributions.99 Instead, complex adaptive systems are often 
characterized by extreme events that might otherwise seem random 
or catastrophic.100 Moreover, nonlinearity reflects what are known to 
complexity scholars as “strange attractors,” which can amplify even 
95. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 57, at 17 (finding that in the 1950s “a pluralistic
interpretation of politics had emerged, in which legislative outcomes were said simply to mirror 
the equilibrium of competing group pressures”). 
96. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 14 (noting that “[w]hat makes prediction
especially difficult in these settings is that the forces shaping the future do not add up in a 
simple, systemwide manner” but instead “include nonlinear interactions”).  
97. See, e.g., Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex 
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 173 
(1996) (“Any policy built on a view of the environment as not changing is likely to fall short of 
its stated objectives . . . .”); Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, 
Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 131 (1996) (noting that the term can be 
misapplied, but stating that one of the central lessons of the “new” ecology is greater 
appreciation of the role that “disturbance regimes play in sustaining ecological processes”); 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 11–12 
(1996) (finding that “balance” in nature is a meaningless concept).  
98. Fred Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American
Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 869–70 (1994), quoted in Farber, supra note 
20, at 152. 
99. Farber, supra note 20, at 152–53. 
100. See id. at 153 (“This unusual statistical distribution is the most significant feature of
complexity.”). See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 878 (“That is catastrophe: a sudden qualitative change 
in a dynamical system brought about by a continuous change in a system variable.”). 
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the smallest perturbation of a system’s interactions into just such 
extreme events.101 
One of the difficult features of complexity theory, especially in a 
field like law, is that its emphasis on nonlinearity means that it does 
not lend itself well to the development of predictive, falsifiable 
models.102 That does not, however, strip it of value: it may yet be 
capable of capturing elements of legal systems that otherwise elude 
reductionist, linear models. 
An example of nonlinearity in public law comes from the 
literature on “republican moments,” which are defined as 
extraordinary periods when broad segments of the electorate 
suddenly become intensely interested in a political issue, causing 
legislators to enact statutes that are far more in line with public values 
than special interest models would predict.103 That is, in the parlance 
of complexity theory, even if the logic of collective action is accepted 
as generally true in terms of the day-to-day operation of politics, it 
does not capture the behavior of the political system as a whole after 
factoring in the element of nonlinear extreme events. Indeed, 
Professor James Pope, claims that “[t]he most important 
transformations in our political order . . . were brought on by 
republican moments.”104 Nonlinearity, in other words, is a feature of 
the political system that may allow it to transcend the effects of such 
routine interactions as special interest lobbying. 
101. See id. at 864: 
While the system is on a particular orbit around a strange attractor, moreover, it is 
highly sensitive to small perturbations so that if “nudged” ever so slightly off the orbit 
path just a little bit, the system responds over time with an arbitrarily large trajectory 
shift. Strange attractors systems thus “amplify tiny differences hidden far along the 
decimal tail, well below any error threshold you may care to set. 
(quoting JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS 191 (1994)). 
102. See, e.g., id. at 928 (“I confess—as any adherent of dynamical systems theory must—
that I cannot predict the outcome of [proposed] reforms with precision . . . .”). 
103. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (“[P]olitics alternates between normal periods, in which public attention is 
weak, and extraordinary periods, in which the issue has high salience for the public. . . . Those 
periods are likely to be attended by new legislative initiatives responding to this public 
demand.”); Hornstein, supra note 88, at 418 (“[E]nvironmental statutes are enacted not during 
the ‘normal’ political periods that are typically responsive to conventional interest group 
pressures, but rather during ‘extraordinary moments’ when broad segments of the population 
become intensely interested in environmental issues . . . .”).  
104. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 291–93 (1990). 
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In an article with the especially intriguing title Is Democracy 
Like Sex?,105 law professor Glenn Reynolds puts the point explicitly in 
terms of complexity theory when he argues that, even if electoral 
choices in a democracy are unstable, their very randomness and 
unpredictability can have the effect of increasing the political system’s 
resistance to such social parasitism as special interest influence. He 
compares this result to the explanation by evolutionary biologists of 
sexual reproduction as a means of creating a genetic “moving target” 
that thwarts biological parasites in a more effective way than would 
the more genetically predictable mechanism of asexual 
reproduction.106 The adaptiveness in both kinds of systems, which 
results from aperiodic events that mix things up, leads Professor 
Reynolds to conclude that “discoveries resulting from the application 
of complexity theory to the question of evolutionary fitness among 
biological systems have important implications for . . . the fitness of 
the body politic.”107 
A somewhat less flamboyant, but equally interesting, illustration 
of nonlinearity in legislative activity is offered by law professor 
Vincent Di Lorenzo.108 Using well-known case studies of federal 
legislation,109 he finds that the operation of a number of factors—
including the role of policy entrepreneurs, publicity, ideology, 
electoral advantage, legislative procedures, and chance—better 
explains statutory outcomes than do reductionist, special interest 
models.110 Di Lorenzo is careful to note that “[t]here is no attempt in 
this Article to substitute a constant, multiple-factor linear approach 
for the one-factor approach which prevailed in the past.”111 Rather, 
with explicit reference to complexity theory, Di Lorenzo argues 
instead that there are inescapable and important elements of chance 
that, “in combination with other forces, lead to unexpected periods of 
105. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635 (1995).
106. See id. at 1637–38 (“[T]he conclusions reached by evolutionary biologists regarding the
advantages of sexual reproduction are likely to be applicable to complex dynamic systems that 
are not biological, including political systems.”). 
107. Id. at 1637.
108. Di Lorenzo, supra note 1. 
109. Professor Di Lorenzo uses studies of congressional trade legislation during the period
1953–1963 conducted by Professors Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, id. 
at 436–38; Professor Martha Derthick’s study of the Social Security Act, id. at 438–40; and a 
study of legislation affecting disabled persons by Professors Stephan Percy and Richard Scotch, 
id. at 440–43.  
110. Id. at 433–35.
111. Id. at 434–35.
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turbulence.”112 The role of a strange attractor in the legal system, and 
the powerful effect of small perturbations in complex adaptive 
systems, is perhaps captured no better than in a newspaper story 
quoted by Di Lorenzo: “For years, a bill requiring advertisers to 
attach safety warnings to liquor commercials has collected more dust 
than votes. Then Nancy Moore Thurmond, the 22-year old daughter 
of the Republican Senator from South Carolina, was . . . killed by a 
drunken driver . . . . Her death gave the legislation a new life.”113 
II. COMPLEXITY THEORY AND NORMATIVE
CLAIMS TO INCREASE EXPERIMENTATION AND 
ADAPTABILITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE 
Having introduced some of the key features of complexity theory 
and having attempted to show their possible contributions to legal 
analysis, I wish now explicitly to add an important note of caution. To 
be sure, as Robert Shaw so eloquently observed, “You don’t see 
something until you have the right metaphor to let you perceive it.”114 
But it is precisely because there has sometimes been such infatuation 
with complexity theory in the legal literature115 that one should 
remember that metaphors generally, and complexity theory in 
particular, can have important limitations. 
112. Id. at 435.
113. Id. at 443–44 (quoting Clifford Kraus, Liquor—Warning Bill Reflects Personal Impact
on Public Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at A20). 
114. GLEICK, supra note 66, at 262.
115. See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law,
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium (pt 1), 65 TENN. L. REV. 925, 
926 (1998) (suggesting the overarching use of complexity theory to analyze features across 
economic and legal systems); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to 
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 1407, 1481–84 (1996) (calling for devolution of power to the states to reflect a “long
jump” to a new fitness landscape); Ruhl, supra note 1, at 923 (calling for ending deference to
administrative agency decisions to take advantage of the more dynamical qualities of the
judicial experience); Ruhl, supra note 9, at 980 (claiming that environmental law must be
“revolutionized” with complex adaptive systems as its model); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr.,
The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the
Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 405, 467 (1997) (issuing a broad call to “break the cycle” of complex legal
structures); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 1, at 806–09 (using an analogy of complex adaptive
systems to explain the accretion of rules across the regulatory landscape); James Salzman et al.,
Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253, 270–74 (2002) (identifying positive and negative
feedback loops as features of complex adaptive systems in law generally). 
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Claims based on complexity theory, because of the nonlinear 
attributes on which they gain their strength, are often impossible to 
falsify116 and thus may be dangerous to invoke for normative 
purposes. Thus, to say that chance sometimes, even often, plays a role 
in the legislative process117 does not necessarily mean that special 
interest distortions are not worth correcting.118 Similarly, to say that 
feedback loops are important in understanding complex adaptive 
systems does not mean that simply designing any kind of artificial 
process that generates feedback for use in human institutions will 
necessarily generate good information for policymakers—after all, if 
there are even small flaws in the design, sensitivity to initial 
conditions will operate to magnify the resultant errors. In this Part of 
the Article, I address the contributions that complexity theory might 
make in evaluating the numerous claims in the legal literature that 
public policy formation in general and regulatory design in particular 
should be more expressly experimental and adaptive. 
It is almost impossible to condense the claims made over the past 
ten years that urge greater use of experimentalism in public policy 
formation. At the level of structural federalism, law professors 
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel make perhaps the most sweeping 
normative proposal: a shift from centralized regulation to a plethora 
of local governance units that would engage in “deliberative 
polyarchy” and experimentally address a broad range of social 
problems.119 Numerous commentators, including Professors Farber 
and Freeman in this Symposium, allude to the possibilities for 
effective “modular” regulatory arrangements that promise to be more 
adaptive in addressing regional environmental problems.120 The 
116. See Roe, supra note 1, at 667 (noting, even after making the case that path dependence
may explain comparative features of corporate governance structures, that, “[r]ight now, none 
of the three paradigms—chaos, evolution to the local hilltop, or path dependence—is developed 
enough to enable us to make explanatory predictions”). 
117. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 1, at 434–35 (“A recurring conclusion flowing from chaos
theory is that change—from legislative inertia to action—is unpredictable. The very existence of 
some of the factors inducing change—e.g. chance and publicity—cannot be predicted even in 
the short-term.”). 
118. See infra notes 186–93 and accompanying text (expressing concern that special interest
distortions could affect an experimentalist program of adaptive management). 
119. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 8, at 287–88 (arguing that the United States should create
“linked systems” of local and interlocal governments to share information about local solutions 
to common problems). 
120. Daniel A. Farber & Jody Freeman, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 795 (2005); see also Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 951–52 (discussing broader conceptions of
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growing legal literature on “adaptive management” addresses the 
possibility that administrative agencies can base management 
decisions on programs of structured experimentation and learning.121 
A. The Genetic Algorithm and the Allure of Adaptation
The broad literature on experimentalism includes frequent
analogies drawn to complexity theory and to the role of adaptation in 
complex adaptive systems.122 To illustrate both the promise and the 
peril of these analogies, I turn to the genetic algorithm. Within the 
past twenty-five years, researchers in the field of artificial intelligence 
have taken some of the mechanisms of adaptation found in biological 
evolution and transposed them into the simulated environment of 
computer programming.123 One of the most notable of these 
techniques, the genetic algorithm, was developed in 1975 by Professor 
John Holland.124 In many ways, a genetic algorithm is almost a 
adaptive management that include “evolving institutional configurations”). 
121. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 52 
(2001) (“Perhaps the best concise definition of adaptive management is simply ‘learning by 
doing.’”); Emison, supra note 97, at 190 (“We need to promote experimentation . . . .”); 
Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 948–49 (describing adaptive management as a form of scientific 
hypothesis-testing by which agencies could “identify areas of uncertainty, develop testable 
hypotheses, and use the implementation phase of the proposed action to verify and to field-test 
these hypotheses”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 938–40 (2002) 
(proposing that agencies “devise and implement a monitoring program . . . [and] be required to 
disclose postdecision monitoring data to the public, and, under [some] circumstances . . . to 
adjust mitigation measures, modify their plans, or revise their environmental analysis in light of 
revealed conditions”); John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from a River? Managing 
Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 739 (1999) (“Adaptive 
management does not call just for experimentation, but for experimentation that generates a 
measurable response.”). 
122. See, e.g., Emison, supra note 97, at 180–87 (linking key features of adaptive
management systems to such features of complex adaptive systems as nonlinearity, emergence, 
and attractors); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 196 (2002) (referring to “important and 
non-trivial insight from complexity theory, applicable across complex non-linear dynamic 
systems in general”); Ruhl, supra note 9, at 943–54, 996 (discussing the environment in terms of 
a complex adaptive system and then arguing for adaptive management as an appropriate policy 
device to be used by environmental managers). 
123. See, e.g., Kenneth De Jong et al., A History of Evolutionary Computation, in
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION § A2.3.1, § A2.3.3 (Thomas Bäck et al. eds., 
1997) (recounting the history of evolutionary computing, including the development of the 
genetic algorithm).  
124. See JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS 32–36
(1975) (explaining the basic concepts underlying genetic algorithms). 
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paradigm for harnessing the power of adaptation to solve difficult 
problems. 
A computer program using a genetic algorithm unleashes a 
variety of problem-solving “strategies,” each one captured in a 
relatively simple string of computer code, onto a “problem space” 
designed to represent a problem that needs solving.125 None of these 
strategies has “cognition”; instead, each simply attacks the problem 
space following the only approach it has—the one coded into its 
program in much the same way that a biological gene is associated 
with a single trait.126 Just as a matter of blind luck, some strategies will 
be more successful at solving the problem than others, based on some 
external measure of success (“fitness”). After an interval of time, the 
most successful strategies are directed to recombine (“mate”) with 
each other.127 Thus, the most successful strategy may be mated with 
the next most successful, the third most successful strategy with the 
fourth, and so on.128 Mating between a pair of programs produces an 
offspring, a new strategy, made up partly of computer code from 
“Parent 1” and partly of computer code from “Parent 2.”129 These 
second-generation programs are then allowed to operate within the 
problem space until the action is again stopped, fitness is determined, 
and only the most successful second-generation programs are allowed 
to recombine their strategies into a third generation of offspring.130 
And so on. Being in silica, rather than in real life, each iteration-
episode often only takes an instant.131 The process is repeated—in a 
simple case, three hundred to four hundred iterations may be 
125. The text captures an oversimplified explanation of a genetic algorithm, leaving out
features that are quite important in other contexts, such as the introduction of random 
mutations, the crossover point used in recombinations, and the number of agents. Excellent 
explanations of genetic algorithms are found in John H. Holland, Genetic Algorithms, SCI. AM., 
July 1992, at 66, 66–72, and John H. Holland, Adaptive Algorithms for Discovering and Using 
General Patterns in Growing Knowledge Bases, 4 INT’L J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & INFO. SYSTEMS 
245, 245–68 (1980). 
126. See EMANUEL FALKENAUER, GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND GROUPING PROBLEMS 25–
34 (1998) (discussing the design and encoding of genetic algorithms in terms of such biological 
features as genes, genotypes, and phenotypes). 




131. See infra note 140 (referencing a real-time applet that demonstrates the algorithm’s
speed). 
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completed in less than one minute132—until there is little room for 
marginal improvement between iterations, at which point a strategy 
has evolved that represents an approximate solution to the problem.133 
In the parlance of complexity theory, a genetic algorithm shares 
some of the features of a complex adaptive system. It is composed of 
“agents” (the individual strategies) that “interact” with the 
environment (the “problem space”) and that “adapt” based on those 
interactions (through the selection mechanism that sorts strategies by 
fitness and then combines strategies to produce offspring).134 There is 
an element of “self-assembly” that follows some relatively simple and 
predetermined selection rules. And from repeated trial-and-error 
iterations and selection, an approximate solution “emerges.” It 
reflects a paradigmatic example of structured problem solving over 
time. 
The power of this problem-solving mechanism can be impressive. 
An especially striking example of this power involves an “intractable” 
computational problem known as “the traveling salesman problem” 
(TSP), which occurs in numerous real-world settings, including the 
coordination of airline schedules and the routing of telephone calls.135 
But the goal in the basic TSP is to find the shortest “tour” that allows 
a salesman to visit each of N cities, finishing the tour in the same city 
from which the salesman began.136 As a matter of straight 
calculation,137 testing every possibility for a thirty-city tour would 
require 2.65 × 1032 additions.138 This is such a huge number that, even 
132. The reader can see how a genetic algorithm works in real time with an easy-to-use
demonstration applet found at http://math.hws.edu/xJava/GA/.  
133. See Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity,
and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 953–54 (1994) (describing genetic algorithms to include the 
process whereby, “[i]f an existing network does not satisfactorily solve the novel problem, the 
computer will recombine strong if-then statements into new networks of connections and test 
these new networks as a solution to the problem”). 
134. See FALKENAUER, supra note 126, at 29–30 (describing genetic algorithms as a method
by which an initial population of solutions first is applied to the search space, then subjected to a 
fitness evaluation for each individual in the population, with the more fit individuals then 
selected to form a parental set that are recombined to produce offspring). 
135. Id.
136. See id. at 438 (describing the format and goal of the TSP).
137. The total number of possible routes in an n-city tour is n! (n factorial). See ADIT
Software, Travelling Salesman, at http://www.adit.co.uk/html/travelling_salesman.html (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“With five cities the number of 
possible alternative routes is 5! (five factorial) which is 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * 5 = 120 . . . .”). 
138. See id. (finding that the number of possible routes in a thirty-city tour is 30! (thirty
factorial), which is 2.65 × 1032); Michael LaLena, Travelling Salesman Problems Using Genetic 
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with a computer capable of performing one billion calculations per 
second, it would take over 8,000,000,000,000,000 years for the 
computer to finish the job.139 The same computer, programmed with a 
genetic algorithm, could employ the power of iterated trial-and-error 
feedback loops and evolve a solution within about three seconds.140 
Although the genetic algorithm is almost a paradigm for the 
power of problem solving through trial-and-error experimentation, it 
has one subtle but important drawback. At least in the simple form 
explained above, it tends to evolve a single solution.141 The problem is 
that this single solution, although successful in many ways, may not be 
the best solution—it is simply a solution that has been selected from 
the strategies at hand. Economists often refer to this as a “local 
maximum.”142 The standard example of such a local maximum is that 
of mountain climbers trying to climb a peak in the fog by following 
the rule “always keep going up.”143 If they make it and their goal was 
to climb only the one peak, then their solution was the best one 
possible—a “global maximum.” If, however, their goal was to traverse 
a range of mountains, and there are several higher ones nearby, then 
their rule will strand them only on that one peak (the “local 
Algorithms, at http://www.lalena.com/ai/tsp/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with the  
Duke Law Journal) (calculating the number of possible combinations in a thirty-city tour as  
2.65 × 1032). 
139. LaLena, supra note 138; see also Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the
Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 
RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 436 (1997) (noting that the power of exponentiation can cause the total 
number of possible calculations in a four-by-four puzzle to “equal[] the number of 
microseconds . . . since the Big Bang”). 
140. The reader can see a demonstration in real time (the three-second part) of a genetic
algorithm applied to a TSP at http://www.ads.tuwien.ac.at/~guenther/tspga/TSPGA.html. Of 
course, because the genetic algorithm finds only an approximate solution, albeit a highly 
accurate approximation, its power can be overstated by comparing it only to the complete 
computational solution that would be found after an exhaustive search of all thirty-factorial 
tours. A full appreciation of the genetic algorithm’s powers would have to include a comparison 
with other approximation algorithms that have been applied to the TSP. See THOMAS CORMEN 
ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 1022–33 (2d ed. 2001) (“[I]t is unlikely that we can 
find a polynomial-time algorithm for solving this [Traveling Salesman] problem exactly. We 
therefore look instead for good approximation algorithms.”). I am indebted to my colleague 
Andrew Chin for this insight. 
141. See id. at 1032 (explaining that this problem can affect the ability of a genetic algorithm
to guarantee close approximate solutions in the most general case of TSP); see also 
FALKENAUER, supra note 126, at 41 (noting that, in the absence of a “mutation operator,” a 
genetic algorithm can converge toward a local maximum). 
142. See, e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 45, at 1687–88 (contrasting “local
maxim[a]” and “global maxim[a]”). 
143. Id.
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maximum”) and obscure the broader set of strategies (the “global 
maximum”) that would allow them to complete the traverse into 
higher terrain.144 
One of the ways to prevent a system from getting stuck at a local 
maximum is to introduce greater variance among the strategies in 
play.145 For this reason, genetic algorithms often deliberately 
introduce mutations into the mix of evolving solutions—to prevent 
the otherwise inexorable selection process from overlooking 
possibilities.146 But the linkage between variance and adaptation is 
hardly limited to genetic algorithms:147 such linkage can occur in social 
and political systems too.148 As Professors Robert Axelrod and 
Michael Cohen observe, “the surprising dynamics that occur in 
complex systems are often consequences of such variety, as when a 
long-reigning political coalition collapses with the arrival of what 
seemed to be a minor new participant.”149 
B. Lessons from the Genetic Algorithm for Designing Experimental
Governance
1. The Argument for Devolution.  Consider first the burgeoning
academic literature on increasing experimentalism through 
144. Id.; see also Roe, supra note 1, at 643 (“To achieve the next, much higher summit in the 
chain of hills . . . we would have to go down this hill, and then up the next one. But natural 
selection, by selecting only upward-bound characteristics, stymies us from going down the hill. 
We are stuck in a local equilibrium . . . .”). 
145. See FALKENAUER, supra note 126, at 41 (noting that, to avoid undue convergence on a
local maximum, “it is the mutation operator which is in charge of reintroducing those missing 
alleles back into the genetic pool”). 
146. Id.; see also LaLena, supra note 138 (“Mutation is when the [genetic algorithm]
randomly changes one of the solutions. Sometimes a mutation can lead to a better solution that 
a crossover would not have found.”). 
147. The exploration/exploitation dilemma is not unique to genetic algorithms but also
affects “greedy” algorithms generally. See CORMEN ET AL., supra note 140, at 370 (discussing 
the effect on “greedy” algorithms, which make the choice that appears optimal at every 
opportunity). I am again indebted to my colleague Andrew Chin for this observation.  
148. Legal analysis too has been informed by the use of, and difficulties presented by, local
and global maxima. In addition to Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 45, other legal 
scholarship also refers to the concepts of local maxima and global maxima on occasion. See, e.g. 
Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557, 1563 
(2002) (arguing that a regime of judicial review could “constitute a local-maximum trap, akin to 
the problem facing subsistence farmers who are unable to switch to more productive 
technologies because they will starve to death in the meantime”).  
149. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 32. 
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devolution from federal to state and local governments.150 To a large 
extent, proponents anchor their claims to the promise that devolution 
will increase variance, leading to better solutions. Thus, for example, 
Professors Dorf and Sabel argue that “pursuit of many alternatives is 
the best way to understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, 
and so contributes to selection of the best current possibilities.”151 
Professor Gary Brynar, addressing devolution of environmental 
regulation, argues that state and local governance would increase 
“innovation, experimentation . . . and the opening up of politics to 
[new] groups.”152 Professor Jonathan Adler claims that, “[g]iven the 
stagnation of environmental reform efforts at the federal level and 
the tremendous burst of environmental innovation in many states, 
encouraging environmental devolution is anything but anti-
environmental.”153 
The appeal to greater variance, however, is not without its costs. 
Indeed, it poses a familiar problem to students of complex adaptive 
150. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 
(1998) (referring to Justice Brandeis’ oft-repeated characterization of the states as experimental 
“laboratories” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J. dissenting))); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 276–77 (2004) (describing as “‘experimentalist innovations’. . . a
variety of administrative arrangements characterized by continuous, interactive cycles of local
innovation and central monitoring”); Sarah C. Rispin, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and
Constructive Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1662 (2003) (finding
that cooperative federalism is often touted as a means to allow “for more innovation and
experimentation in government” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991))). But 
see Fernando R. LaGuarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health Care
Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 160 (1993) (identifying, and then challenging, the notion that states
offer loci of robust policy experimentation).
151. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 8, at 303; see also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies
and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 712 (1991) (arguing that devolution would 
“permit[] subnational governments to engage in regulatory experimentation” to reflect a broad 
diversity of community cultures).  
152. Gary C. Bryner, Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to 
Sustainable Development, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 8 (2002). 
153. Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 694 (2001). There is, of course, a vibrant literature contesting the 
argument that states have been the source of “tremendous” innovation. See, e.g., Rena I. 
Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 382–400 (2000) 
(noting that the failures of state environmental regulation have been well-documented); Kirsten 
H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 
48 HASTINGS L. J. 271, 294–295 (1997) (stating that one concern of federal environmental
legislation is laxity of state standards resulting from interstate competition); Andrew Hecht,
Note, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations
on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 198 (2004) (arguing that state environmental
agencies are hampered by legal limitations in adopting protective rules). 
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systems: the dilemma between exploration and exploitation.154 This 
dilemma reflects the tension between copying (and enjoying the 
benefits) of tested strategies that have proven somewhat effective—
exploitation—and the search for untested types that might be 
better—exploration.155 As Professors Axelrod and Cohen observe, 
“This trade-off . . . has turned out to be illuminating across a wide 
range of settings from simple genetics to organizational resource 
allocation, wherever the testing of new types comes at some expense 
to realizing benefits of those already available.”156 Not all exploration 
is successful. And especially when irreversible outcomes are possible, 
policy experimentation can result in irreplaceable losses.157 
There is never an easy answer to the exploration-exploitation 
dilemma. But the dilemma itself may help explain why so much of the 
current legal literature on adaptive federalism tends to focus on 
institutional redesigns for cooperative federalism and federal-state 
coordination under the supervision of federal administrative agencies, 
rather than the more extreme alternative of complete 
defederalization.158 To be sure, some scholars favor just this kind of 
defederalization, premised on the notion that competition among 
states for citizens and firms will mediate the benefits and costs of state 
154. See, e.g., James G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,
2 ORG. SCI. 71, 71 (1991) (“A central concern of studies of adaptive processes is the relation 
between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties.”). 
155. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 43. 
156. Id.; see also March, supra note 154, at 71 (“Both exploration and exploitation are
essential for organizations, but they compete for scarce resources.”). 
157. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 51 (developing conditions under which
exploration may be justified, citing problems that have a “low risk of catastrophe from 
exploration”); see also Doremus, supra note 121, at 67 (noting that robust agency 
experimentation on the Columbia River was dampened by concern over effects on already 
endangered salmon runs); infra notes 186–93 and accompanying text. 
158. The literature on this feature of cooperative federalism, although not explicitly
recognizing either complexity theory or the exploration/exploitation dilemma, is large. See, e.g., 
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 8, at 434–35 (suggesting that Congress has used cooperative federalism 
in the Federal Clean Air Act and in “other areas as well”); Michael S. Greve, Against 
Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 561–62 (2000) (comparing and critiquing cooperative 
federalism in Germany and the United States); Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its 
Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (noting aspects of cooperative federalism of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act but recognizing that, “[a]lthough relatively new to the 
telecommunications industry, cooperative federalism is a familiar feature in other regulatory 
regimes”); Michael L. Gallo, Note, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 417, 431 (2000) (“In spite of the Supreme Court’s comment [in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board] that ‘a federal program administered by 50 independent state agencies is surpassing
strange,’ this sort of ‘cooperative federalism’ characterizes many laws . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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experimentation.”159 But such arguments have met objections 
questioning whether there really is enough of a competitive “market” 
for states to create beneficial variance if left to their own devices.160 
Assuming that the results of this theoretical debate have not yet 
settled, it is empirically plain that most federal programs have shied 
away from radical defederalization and, instead, have located reforms 
within the more familiar boundaries of cooperative federalism.161 
The exploration-exploitation dilemma described by complexity 
theory may help explain why this is, and should be, the case. Policy 
experiments within existing statutory and administrative structures 
carry with them the advantage of maintaining as a fallback 
mechanism the (exploitation) benefits of minimum federal standards, 
while allowing under varying levels of supervision a search for 
different ways of doing things (exploration).162 This explains, for 
example, not only the basic structure of cooperative federalism (as 
opposed to rank defederalization), but also the location of regulatory 
reforms within the cooperative federalism framework. For example, 
the devolution literature itself often emphasizes the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency’s “Project XL” experiment, which 
allows for regulatory flexibility only for firms promising “superior 
environmental performance” over the Agency’s baseline of 
preexisting rules.163 It also explains the innumerable “variance” and 
159. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
1236–44 (1992) (arguing that, as a result of competition, states will maximize social welfare to 
attract citizens and businesses and thus will refrain from adopting suboptimally lax 
regulations—contrary to the traditional race-to-the-bottom dynamic).  
160. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, supra note 153, at 278 (questioning the assumption of
perfect competition among states); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid 
Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. 
L. REV. 1481, 1505–06 (1995) (arguing that immobility and lack of information undermine the
existence of a market in citizens sufficient to insulate states from an inefficient race to the
bottom). But see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental
Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 549–51 (1997) (claiming that an
interstate market for citizens and firms does function competitively).
161. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting the widespread use of cooperative-
federalism designs in federal statutes across a wide programmatic spectrum). 
162. See supra note 158 (describing how frequently federal statutes enlist states in regulatory 
endeavors characterized by cooperative-federalism). 
163. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 56, at 309–10 (“[T]he idea is to excuse some supposedly less 
significant regulatory violations in exchange for agreements to transcend the standards in more 
important respects . . . .”); Freeman, supra note 8, at 55–66 (describing the implementation of 
two XL agreements); Beth S. Ginsberg & Cynthia Cummis, EPA’s Project XL: A Paradigm for 
Promising Regulatory Reform, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,059, 10,060–61 (1996) 
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“adjustment” mechanisms in federal environmental and public health 
statutes that allow agencies to retain the exploitation benefits of 
federal rules while simultaneously allowing some members of the 
regulated community an opportunity to demonstrate innovative ways 
to meet regulatory objectives (exploration).164 Indeed, in an especially 
thoughtful piece, law professor Bradley Karkkainen captures 
perfectly the dynamic behind the exploration-exploitation dilemma 
by arguing for the use of “regulatory penalty default[s]” by which 
administrative agencies would impose on parties a known baseline of 
prescriptive regulation (exploitation) against which the parties would 
have an incentive to bargain around in developing a less expensive, 
more innovative means of reaching the agency’s goals (exploration).165 
In this case, viewing governance as a complex adaptive system offers 
insights on when regulatory reform efforts are most apt to provide 
policymaking improvement. 
2. The Argument for Adaptive Management.  More often than
not, proponents of adaptive regulation have in mind something other 
than increasing variance through devolution. Instead, they propose a 
reform project for administrative agencies grounded partly in the 
(comparing Project XL to other legislative reform initiatives). In highlighting the Agency’s 
“Project XL” experiment, I do not seek to endorse its effectiveness. Indeed, there are reasons to 
think that, in practice, it may be highly ineffective. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory 
Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10527, 10529–30 (1996) (describing Project XL as a “free-for-all” of unrelated exemptions 
and firm “wish lists” that do not, in fact, receive effective agency review). My point is that, with 
the exploitation/exploration insight from complexity theory, it is at least understandable why 
regulatory experimentation took this form, and should have taken this form, over a more radical 
devolutionary approach. 
164. See Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through
Incremental Adjustment, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (2004) (providing examples of five statutes 
that allow federal agencies flexibility to adjust the application of the statutes at the “back end”). 
Undoubtedly the most discussed of such mechanisms, at least in the adaptation-through-
experimentation literature, are the provisions for Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) under the 
Federal Endangered Species Act. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm 
in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (discussing the origin and purpose 
of HCPs); Doremus, supra note 121, at 68–74 (discussing the history and application of HCPs); 
Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the 
Endangered Species Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 767–89 (discussing the qualities of HCPs). 
165. Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 967. To illustrate such default rules, Professor Karkkainen
points to the Federal Endangered Species Act’s “incidental take” permits, by which land 
developers who implement federally approved HCPs can avoid the Act’s strict regulatory 
default provision prohibiting private landowners from “taking” the habitat of listed species.” Id. 
at 970–75. 
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aspirations of scientific pragmatism:166 that agencies themselves can 
reap the benefits of structured learning over time through a 
systematic program of active experimentation.167 The emphasis on 
experimentation is especially noticeable in claims that environmental 
agencies should follow the principles of “adaptive management.”168 In 
an insightful article, Professor Holly Doremus notes the nuances of 
adaptive management but nonetheless offers a useful simplification: 
adaptive management is “learning by doing.”169 In a recent report of 
the National Research Council,170 adaptive management was defined 
to include several key features: regularly revisited management 
objectives,171 a range of management choices,172 mechanisms for 
incorporating learning into future decisions,173 the use of models that 
can accommodate uncertainty,174 and the monitoring and evaluation 
166. See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to
Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1–13 (2004) (noting the resurgence of 
pragmatism in legal thought and also noting difference among different schools of pragmatic 
philosophy). 
167. See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1037,
1046 (2003) (“[T]he political process itself may exhibit many attributes of pragmatism—in 
particular, a reliance on experimentation and feedback as an approach to problem 
solving . . . .”); Mintz, supra note 166, at 5 (finding that pragmatism emphasizes experimentation 
among other values); Volkman, supra note 121, at 739–55 (“Adaptive management does not call 
just for experimentation, but for experimentation that generates a measurable response.”).  
168. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 121, at 52 (“The essence of adaptive management . . . is
simply ‘learning by doing.’”); Farber, supra note 55, at 882 (asserting that institutions for eco-
pragmatism will require careful design to allow for “flexible, experimental management”); Ana 
M. Parma et al., What Can Adaptive Management Do for Our Fish, Forests, Food, and
Biodiversity?, 1 INTEGRATIVE BIOLOGY 16, 19 (1998) (“[A]daptive management consists of
managing according to a plan by which decisions are made and modified as a function of what is 
known and learned about the system, including information about the effect of previous
management actions.”). 
169. Doremus, supra note 121, at 52.
170. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES 
PROJECT PLANNING (2004). 
171. The Panel was clear in establishing that adaptive management does not postpone
action until “enough” is known, id. at 19, and that there must be some level of agreement among 
management objectives if the undertaking should even begin, id. at 24. 
172. When possible, adaptive management envisions the simultaneous implementation of
“two or more carefully monitored actions [that] can allow for rapid discrimination among 
competing models.” Id. at 26. 
173. The Panel was clear that adaptive management will not achieve improved policymaking 
unless there is a “mechanism to integrate knowledge gained in monitoring into management 
actions” and “the political will to act upon knowledge gained from monitoring.” Id. at 27. 
174. The Panel stressed that, precisely because adaptive management was intended to
operate in areas of high uncertainty, “complete or perfect . . . models . . . [would] not need to be 
crafted in order to support decisions.” Id. at 25. 
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of outcomes.175 At bottom, adaptive management involves 
“feedback,”176 is “iterative,”177 and is “structured”178 to take advantage 
of a “mix of progress and setbacks.”179 
Adaptive management, thus, shares essential features with 
genetic algorithms, which are also structured to provide iterative 
feedback that is used to take advantage of successes and failures.180 Of 
course, this is not to say that the proponents of adaptive management 
base their arguments expressly on analogies to the problem-solving 
attributes of genetic algorithms.181 But the genetic algorithm is useful 
because it highlights in a visible, simple way one of the key features of 
successful, adaptive problem solving: meaningful feedback. In a 
genetic algorithm, feedback is produced every time that the various 
strategies are measured for success, and then the feedback is used to 
create the next generation of strategies, which, in turn, generate more 
meaningful feedback when they are measured for success as the 
process repeats itself.182 Of special relevance for purposes of this 
Article is that, in a genetic algorithm, the metric of success (the fitness 
function) is clear-cut and uncontested, fitness itself is measurable and 
measured accurately, the results of each iteration are used 
meaningfully to structure the next iteration, there are multiple 
iterations generating feedback, and feedback is fast.183 
To assume that any of these features would have their analogue 
in a real-life regulatory setting is beyond heroic. That is not to say 
175. The Panel emphasized that “[m]onitoring systems should be an integral part of
program design at the outset and not simply added post hoc after implementation.” Id. at 26. 
176. Id. at 22.
177. Id. at 24.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Id. at 24.
180. See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text.
181. Proponents of adaptive regulation do, however, allude regularly to complexity theory
for general support. See, e.g., Lee P. Breckinridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and 
the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOL. L.Q. 692, 703 n.32 (1999) 
(citing to the literature on complexity theory as relevant to institutions for collaborative 
governance); Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 379, 382 & n.16 (2000) (noting the importance of underlying 
adaptability in complex adaptive systems to institutions for collaborative governance); Emison, 
supra note 97, at 167 (identifying the need to model environmental management institutions 
themselves as complex adaptive systems); Farber, supra note 55, at 880 (making the case for 
pragmatism in part because of the nature of “complex dynamic systems”). 
182. See FALKENAUER, supra note 126, at 45–53 (describing strategies for the selection of
fitness). 
183. Id. at 29–30.
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that designing adaptive administrative processes is impossible, only 
that the newfound enthusiasm for this project seems curious. After 
all, federal administrative agencies have shown relatively little 
interest in systematic program evaluation as a general matter,184 and 
“[t]rue random experimental designs are rare, if not entirely 
nonexistent, in environmental policy.”185 The data generated in any 
real-world experiments, moreover, would undoubtedly be contested 
and subject to political pressure,186 and agencies facing hard look 
judicial review have been “chary of revisiting old rules, even in the 
name of flexibility.”187 
These problems are not necessarily insurmountable. But, in 
addition to the types of difficulties just enumerated, there is a more 
systematic design problem that has so far eluded discussion in the 
adaptive management literature. The problem stems from the 
exploration-exploitation dilemma and might be especially relevant for 
regulatory programs in which experimentation is substituted, at least 
in part, for action.188 After all, no one is suggesting that agencies relax 
all of their rules and substitute rank trial-and-error simply for its own 
sake. Instead, experimentation will be of most value when there is a 
level of uncertainty that might be reduced by a systematic program of 
scientific inquiry.189 Yet, in determining the value of experimentation 
(exploration), values will be discounted by the foregone benefits of 
applying the agency’s existing regulations (exploitation). Especially 
184. See Cary Coglianese & Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Environmental Policies, 47 
ENVIRONMENT (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(noting that “program evaluation research has been remarkably scarce”).  
185. Id. (manuscript at 15).
186. See Doremus, supra note 121, at 82 (claiming that “[m]onitoring data are likely to be
ambiguous, difficult to interpret, and at the frontiers of scientific knowledge . . . . [and] 
disagreement among the experts within the agency[] is likely to exacerbate the tendency to 
interpret data according to political, rather than scientific, signals”). See generally Donald T. 
Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the New, 
Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 228 (Fall 2003) (discussing 
new features in administrative law, the Shelby Amendment and Data Quality Act, as “a new 
subterranean, battleground . . . in which the scent of future regulation is caught by stakeholders 
who then battle to shape the scientific facts on which future regulation may be based”). 
187. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1420 (1992). 
188. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 26–27 (describing the role of
experimentation in adaptive management). 
189. See id. at 25–27 (noting that adaptive management is intended to operate in areas of
high uncertainty in which there is a mechanism for integrating knowledge gained from 
monitoring into management actions). 
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when such values are high, for example when a species might become 
extinct or public health could worsen because of these foregone 
benefits, this discount rate will be high and the agency will perennially 
reach a rational cost-benefit calculation that it is not worth 
experimenting.190 Moreover, to the extent that the results of 
experimentation will not be available for a length of time (which is 
likely to be the case in most of the ecological settings in which 
adaptive management has been championed), agencies will rationally 
discount even further the benefit of experimentation.191 Indeed, these 
dynamics may help explain the results of the nation’s longest-running 
experience with adaptive management, involving salmon recovery 
efforts within the Columbia River Basin.192 Professor Doremus 
recounts that impediments to experimentation by the Northwest 
Power Planning Council include the “risk of harm to species teetering 
on the edge of extinction [,which] arouses opposition to 
experiments . . . [and the fact that] the political system operates on a 
much shorter time scale than that needed to generate firm data.”193 
At this point, I hasten to add that I am not necessarily hostile to 
reform projects championing adaptive management.194 At least as 
framed by their original developers, these projects genuinely seek to 
improve the quality of regulatory decisionmaking. But my reading of 
this rich, emerging literature is that it often ends in contested 
190. This insight was applied to courts in Hadfield, supra note 45, at 593–94, which
concluded that the greater a court’s confidence that its prior rule had value in preventing harm, 
the more heavily it will discount relaxing that rule to gather information that might be helpful in 
designing a better one.  
191. See id. (concluding that courts would similarly discount the value of experimentation in
the development of common-law doctrine).  
192. See generally Volkman, supra note 121 (discussing the case history of adaptive
management on the Columbia River). 
193. Doremus, supra note 121, at 67. 
194. See, e.g., Fred Bosselman, A Role for State Planning: Intergenerational Equity and
Adaptive Management, 12 J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 320 (2001) (“The growing support for 
adaptive management as a planning system is a reaction to our increasing recognition that we 
are living in an unstable environment.”); Davidson & Geu, supra note 8, at 818 n.7 (citing 
literature on adaptive management); Farber, supra note 20, at 148 (“Adaptive management can 
prevent the worst consequences of a power law from being realized.”); Karkkainen, supra note 
9, at 943 (“Conservation ecologists and natural resource managers assert that integrated 
management of complex ecosystems requires an iterative and adaptive management 
approach.”); Wiener, supra note 97, at 21–22 (discussing interest in adaptive management); see 
also Freeman, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that collaborative governance is supported in part 
because of its advantages under conditions of uncertainty involving continuous monitoring and 
evaluation); Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 193 (supporting collaborative governance in part to 
respond to underlying dynamism and uncertainty in ecosystems). 
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empirical claims and might be improved (while the empirical debate 
settles) by attention to the theoretical design features with which any 
program of experimentation must grapple.195 This, in turn, may help 
policymakers identify the necessary, real-world conditions under 
which adaptive governance by administrative agencies might indeed 
lead to genuine social improvement. Contrariwise, greater attention 
to these necessary conditions will help reveal those policymakers who 
would merely appropriate the metaphor of adaptation and dismantle 
existing governance structures under false pretenses196 without 
providing the mechanisms that would make experimentation work.197 
C. Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory for Collaborative
Administrative Regimes
Some of the literature arguing for more adaptive agencies posits
a process of stakeholder involvement and collaboration rather than 
solely a process of scientific experimentalism.198 Simply from the 
perspective of improved knowledge this is understandable: as the 
National Research Council itself found, “unbounded conflict can tear 
apart the social fabric, thwarting learning.”199 But those commentators 
195. See, e.g., STEFAN H. THOMKE, EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS 4, 10–14 (2003) (noting
that “experimentation is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a larger organizational effort 
toward innovation” and suggesting six design principles to guide successful experimentation 
programs).  
196. See Doremus, supra note 121, at 88 (“Adaptive management can be used as a
smokescreen to conceal political accommodations that sacrifice the protection of species or 
natural systems.”). 
197. Of course, attention to real-world conditions will require more than attention to
decisional strategies designed to provide good information and opportunities to learn. 
Administrative law involves more than simply reaching substantive results. It also reflects 
critical political values—accountability, transparency, and fairness. Therefore, even coherently 
designed adaptive regulatory structures will challenge administrative law. For example, as a 
matter of basic political legitimacy, to what extent may an agency with the statutory obligation 
to take action choose instead a program self-consciously designed to be experimental? Are 
agency policy choices “final” for purposes of judicial review when regulators may see such 
choices merely as adjusting a variable in an overarching program of experimental probing? If 
judicial review is available, what should be its scope? How is the public to gather information 
and participate in an agency’s program of policy experimentation and adaptation, especially 
those members of the public who may see in the agency’s experimental approach a 
transformation of their own status from regulatory beneficiary to guinea pig? Questions such as 
these are beyond the focus on this Article but are plainly noteworthy. 
198. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing that parties need to share responsibility
for policymaking); Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 238 (noting that participation is a deeper 
process than the term “stakeholder” involvement suggests, and arguing for such deep 
participatory involvement). 
199. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 24 (quoting Kai. N. Lee, Appraising 
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arguing for collaboration claim that it promises additional benefits for 
regulatory endeavors in increased creativity,200 improved 
implementation,201 and heightened democratic participation.202 These 
claims underlie regulatory initiatives designed to induce regulatory 
compliance by firms203 as well as broader efforts to create 
stakeholder involvement in the design of regulatory programs 
themselves.204 
The collaborationists’ project has spawned a counterliterature 
arguing that stakeholder-driven processes lack legitimacy in part 
because the participants’ self-interest may work to undercut just such 
“voluntary” or “collaborative” endeavors.205 The counterliterature 
Adaptive Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY Art. 3, Dec. 1999, at http:// 
www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art3).  
200. Freeman, supra note 8, at 23. 
201. Id. at 23–24.
202. Id. at 27–29.
203. The Federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), for example,
implemented in the early 1990s a Voluntary Protection Program whereby firms with strong 
safety records were exempted from regular agency inspection and given primary responsibility 
for monitoring compliance with OSHA regulations. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. 
Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 
1209–10 (1998). In 1995, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted 
incentives for self-policing designed to reduce penalties for firms that discover, report, and 
correct regulatory violations. Incentives for Self Policing; Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711–66 (Dec. 22, 1995). EPA also began a 
voluntary program, known as the “33/50 program,” to induce firms to reduce the emissions of 
toxic chemicals by 33 percent in a first phase and by 50 percent in a second phase. Arora Seema 
& Timothy N. Carson, An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in 
EPA’s 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 271, 271 (1995). More generally, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines reward corporations for postoffense cooperation. William S. 
Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 
644–45 (2002). 
204. In addition to the habitat-conservation-plan program under the Endangered Species
Act, see supra note 164, such efforts would include the encouragement of regulatory negotiation 
(so-called “reg-neg”) by which stakeholders play a significant role in the development of agency 
regulations, Freeman, supra note 8, at 36–55, as well as such “place-based” efforts as the 
multistate Chesapeake Bay Program to address nonpoint pollution, Daniel A. Farber, 
Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 72–73, and the multistakeholder CALFED process for managing water 
and ecological resources in the Bay-Delta system near San Francisco, Farber & Freeman, supra 
note 120, at 838. 
205. See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 203, at 1211 (“In the end, in the absence of more
supporting evidence, those advocating a wholesale departure from a deterrence-based approach 
bear some burden of persuasion . . . .”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on 
Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 500 (2000) 
(noting potential problems with empowering stakeholders as a means of creating collaborative 
government); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389,  
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repeatedly emphasizes economic theory to suggest the frailty of the 
collaborationists’ theoretical foundation.206 The collaborationists, in 
turn, point to growing experience with just such flexible programs and 
suggest that it may be theory, rather than reality, that is “under 
informed.”207  
It is out of this exchange over the theoretical foundations of 
cooperation that law professor Bradley Karkkainen, a proponent of 
collaborative regulation, makes a noted (albeit tongue-in-cheek) plea 
for critics simply to stop using the prisoner’s dilemma as an analytical 
objection to adaptive collaboration: “I want to propose (only half-
facetiously) a moratorium on indulgence in the use of such shopworn 
tools as the Tragedy of the Commons and the Prisoner’s Dilemma to 
analyze the deep structure of these [collaborative] arrangements and 
thereby to prove their impossibility . . . .”208 In fact, as Professor 
Karkkainen himself explores in his subsequent work,209 it is precisely 
within the game-theoretic tradition of the prisoner’s dilemma that a 
theoretical foundation for the collaborationists’ project might be 
found. 
The reason that the prisoner’s dilemma can be a bane, or boon, 
for collaborationists lies in the difference between the static, “one-
shot” form of the game and the iterated, “repeated-play” form, 
especially when this more dynamic form allows for the possibility of 
adaptive behavior.210 Game theory, of which the prisoner’s dilemma is 
a part, shares with complexity theory such features as actors, 
interactions, and emergence (equilibriums).211 Most students of the 
law are familiar with the static 2 × 2 “one-shot” form of the prisoner’s 
426–29 (2003) (noting how firms’ opportunistic behavior can increase agency transaction costs in 
monitoring firm self-regulation); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The 
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 201 (1998) 
(noting that genuine efforts to “reinvent” environmental regulation has not been shown to be 
supported by firms’ self interest); Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise 
and Limits of Community-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1382–89 
(1998) (using bargaining theory to identify potential obstacles to agreement). 
206. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 205, at 426–429; Nickelsburg, supra note 205, at 1382–89.
207. Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 226. 
208. Id.
209. See Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 966 n.75 (citing works that discuss the possibilities for
collaboration under evolutionary game theory). 
210. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 19–20 (1984) (introducing
the idea that cooperation can emerge in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
211. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6–11 (1994);
SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY 41–79 (1995). 
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dilemma.212 Because the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma is that 
rational actors, in a particular setting, will not cooperate even when it 
is to their mutual advantage,213 it is a theoretical thorn in the side for 
those commentators who argue for increased use of cooperation 
through collaborative institutions (as Professor Karkkainen 
recognizes).214 
To appreciate how adaptation can change this outcome, consider 
first the basic lesson of the static, “one-shot” form of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. The basic lesson was popularized by biologist Garrett 
Hardin as the tale of two livestock herders in the “tragedy of the 
commons”215 and was recently transposed especially well into game 
theory’s 2 × 2 static form by political scientist Elinor Ostrom.216 The 
story involves two mountain goat herders sharing an unregulated, 
open-access common area onto which their goats can graze. If they 
turn out too many goats onto the commons, exceeding the area’s 
sustainable carrying capacity, the commons will collapse, the goats 
will starve, and both herders will end up with a “payoff” of 0. If, 
however, the two herders cooperate, determine the overall carrying 
capacity, and abide by an agreement to limit their goats 
212. For an excellent history of the development of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see WILLIAM 
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). The legal literature on the Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
large and varied. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, The Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the 
Behavior of the Independent Judiciary, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 396 (1998); John W. Lam, Note, The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Reassessment of Borrero v. Aljets and the Indefinite Detention of 
Inadmissible Aliens, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297 (2004); Daniel P. Petrov, Note, Prisoners No 
More: State Investment Relocation Incentives and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 33 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 71 (2001); Neil S. Siegel, Comment, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165 (2001).  
213. POUNDSTONE, supra note 212, at 118–20. In the original form from which the prisoner’s 
dilemma gets its name, 
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain 
that they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to 
convict them at trial. He points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to 
confess to the crime the police are sure they have done, or not to confess. If they both 
do not confess, then . . . they will both receive minor punishment [based on evidence 
that the police do have of more minor offenses]; if they both confess [to the major 
offense] they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most severe 
sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive 
lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence whereas the latter will get ‘the book’ 
slapped at him. 
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND
CRITICAL SURVEY 95 (1957).
214. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
215. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 62 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
216. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–5 (1990). 
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appropriately, then each will profit and receive a payoff of 10. But if 
one of the herders secretly “defects” from the agreement and exceeds 
his sustainable allotment, he receives a “cheater’s bonus” of 11 (as he 
will make up in extra goats the incremental weight loss suffered by 
each goat due to overgrazing), whereas the other herder, who naively 
restricts his goats to the agreed-upon allotment, will get the “sucker’s 
payoff” of –1 (because he will not make up the weight loss of 
individual goats with any “extra” animals and will end up losing 
money). The payoff structure, thus, looks like this (Herder A payoff, 
Herder B payoff): 
Herder B 
Herder A Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 10, 10 -1, 11
Defect 11, -1 0, 0
The result of a one-shot “play,” in which the herders know the payoff 
structure but are unsure what the other will do, is tragic: even though 
both herders realize that they would be better off cooperating (10, 10) 
than mutually defecting (0, 0), each herder’s self-interest in 
maximizing gains causes him rationally to defect.217 This scenario, in 
which the players are left to resolve their problems in an unregulated 
market, as Professor Karkainnen appreciates, does not bode well for 
collaborationists. 
The “standard” solution, which Professor Ostrom calls 
“Leviathan,”218 is to posit an infallible administrative agency that will 
always detect and punish defectors with a penalty of, say, -2.219 This 
changes the payoff structure to incentivize the preferred outcome of 
mutual cooperation. Thus, with Leviathan (-2), the new structure 
becomes: 
217. A player is tempted to defect either to seize the cheater’s payoff (if the other
cooperates) or to avoid the sucker’s payoff (if the other defects). The resulting mutual defection 
leaves both worse off and suggests that government regulation is justified to rescue the 
unregulated marketplace from these poor outcomes. 
218. See OSTROM, supra note 216, at 8–10.
219. See id. at 9–10 (representing Leviathan by assuming “that the central authority decides
to impose a penalty of 2 profit units on anyone who is considered by that authority to be using a 
defect strategy”). 
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Herder B 
Herder A Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 10, 10 -1, 9
Defect 9, -1 -2, -2
In the presence of Leviathan, one is always better off cooperating, 
leading society to enjoy the mutual gains shared by a population of 
cooperators.220 Thus, this outcome presents the standard case for 
regulation. Unfortunately, this solution also does not bode well for 
collaborationists, who generally argue against the need for inflexible 
Leviathans. 
But Leviathan is not the only way to overcome prisoner’s 
dilemma situations, especially when one relaxes the one-shot-play 
constraint and considers the real-world situation in which players in 
commons-type situations react with each other repeatedly over time; 
evolutionary game theory, which studies repeat games, can account 
for just this type of adaptation.221 Political scientist Robert Axelrod 
published a provocative contribution in the mid-1980s, The Evolution 
of Cooperation,222 that has been widely noted in the legal literature,223 
and indeed become one of the most-cited works in the social sciences 
over the past twenty years.224 His basic insight stems from a 
220. Id. at 10. A would-be cooperator who would otherwise fear the sucker’s payoff will not
defect defensively because Leviathan’s sanction for defectors (-2) is worse than the sucker’s 
payoff itself (-1); conversely, a would-be defector seeking the cheater’s payoff also will not 
defect because Leviathan’s punishment for defection reduces the cheater’s payoff from 11 to 9 
and because the reward for cooperation (10) is greater than the newly adjusted cheater’s payoff 
(9). Id. 
221. See AXELROD, supra note 11, at 4 (“The main alternative to the assumption of rational
choice is some form of adaptive behavior.”). 
222. AXELROD, supra note 210.
223. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law & Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1138 
n.355 (2000); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 139 n.12 (1996); Kenneth A. Dursht,
Note, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and the Wassenaar Arrangement, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1079, 1093 n.96 (1997); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where 
Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective
Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 41–42 (1993) (noting that Professor Axelrod’s Evolution of
Cooperation has been cited in more than one hundred law review articles).
224. See Robert Hoffman, Twenty Years On: The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited, 3(2) J. 
2005] COMPLEXITY THEORY 955
“tournament” of some two hundred moves, with payoffs similar to 
those used above in the two-herder commons game.225 Thus, if two 
players meet and cooperate, they each receive 10 points; if one cheats 
the other, the cheater gets 11 and the sucker gets –1; if both cheat, 
they each receive 0. The two players collect their points and then 
move on to the next play, and so on. The significant new feature of 
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is that each player knows what the 
other did on previous moves. Whoever has the highest cumulative 
point score at the end of all the plays wins the tournament.226 
The consequences of iteration can be startling. Professor 
Axelrod invited people to submit computer programs embodying 
different strategies to the tournament.227 So, for example, one strategy 
might be to “always defect” (with the hope of accumulating some 
cheater’s bonuses), whereas another might be to “always cooperate” 
(with the hope of meeting some like-minded cooperators and 
accumulating the high-point outcomes of mutual cooperation). But 
neither of these strategies won the tournament. Whenever a program 
met a “pure defector,” there was no benefit in cooperating with such 
a player (and thereby getting the sucker’s payoff), and so the all-too-
frequent result was mutual defection, with each player acquiring no 
points. The “always-cooperate” strategy did not win the tournament 
either. Whenever a program met such a “pure cooperator,” it could 
always do better by defecting (thereby getting the cheater’s payoff of 
11) rather than cooperating (with a mutual-cooperation payoff of
only 10); thus, sadly, pure cooperators were taken advantage of rather
than rewarded with mutual cooperation. The winner of the
tournament was a strategy known as Tit-for-Tat, which always
reciprocated in kind. Thus, when Tit-For-Tat met a cooperator, it
would reciprocate with cooperation and acquire the high points from
mutual cooperation (10), but when the program met a defector, it also
would reciprocate, thereby avoiding the sucker’s payoff (-1).228
ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES & SOC. SIMULATION para. 1.2 (2000), at http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/ 
JASS/3/2/forum/1.html (“According to the Social Science Citation Index, [Axelrod’s] work had 
been quoted more than one thousand times by 1992 and [has been cited] more than 2500 times 
to date.” (citations omitted)). 
225. See AXELROD, supra note 210, at 30–31 (noting that the tournament paired strategies
against each other for two hundred moves and that the payoffs were “the familiar” ones taken 
from the Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
226. Id. at 30.
227. Id. at 31; AXELROD, supra note 11, at 16.
228. See AXELROD, supra note 11, at 16 (describing the experimental design of his original
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The significance of Professor Axelrod’s theoretical work for 
regulatory policy is that, in the real world, perfect Leviathans do not 
exist.229 Administrative agencies cannot reliably monitor the universe 
of potential violations and/or respond infallibly to punish defectors. 
In fact, they cannot come even close to doing so. It has been reported 
that over 40 percent of all state clean-water inspections are labeled 
“reconnaissance, flyovers, or drive-bys in which inspectors never even 
enter the facility.”230 A recent study of seventeen states finds that 
eleven reported inadequate funding for enforcing the Clean Water 
Act,231 whereas another study of thirteen states found “inconsistent” 
enforcement of hazardous waste laws.232 Environmental enforcement 
agencies were reporting that they had only 60 percent and, in some 
cases as little as 20 percent, of the budgetary and manpower 
capability they felt were necessary to do their jobs.233 In the study on 
Clean Water Act enforcement,234 state regulators reported that they 
did not even have complete data on 96 percent of storm water 
dischargers and that approximately 25 percent of major facilities were 
known to be in significant noncompliance with the Act.235 
One can envision a predictable organizational response to data 
such as these. Regulators, fearing widespread evasion of legal rules, 
hunker down into “deterrence mode,” determined to make an 
example of any violators they do detect.236 Inspectors become 
experiment). 
229. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First
Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight 1 (Center for Progressive Reg., White 
Paper No. 404, 2004), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/ 
Enforcement_WP_Oct_ 2004.pdf (reporting survey results showing that state enforcement of 
the Clean Water Act is “woefully inadequate”). 
230. States Slack Off on Environmental Enforcement, OMB WATCH, Feb. 20, 2002, at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/413/-1/235/ (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
231. Rechtschaffen, supra note 229, at 1.
232. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future 
of Environmental Enforcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,803, 10,809 n.60 (2000) 
(reporting on an EPA study of state enforcement under the Federal Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act). 
233. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 229, at 1, 17 (discussing state capabilities for Clean
Water Act enforcement).  
234. Id. at 1. 
235. Id. at 1, 3.
236. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 61 (1992) (modeling conditions under which agencies respond to 
evasion by firms with a “rule-oriented” deterrence posture). 
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inflexible and rule bound; prosecutors will push for maximum 
penalties even in cases that might otherwise warrant leniency.237 In 
1992, using the example of a hypothetical environmental agency 
seeking to reduce pollution from a firm’s factories, Professors Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite reported on the work of Professor John 
Scholz, who had employed the 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma format to 
model the behavioral and organizational implications:238 






Comply  Voluntary Compliance   
Compliance cost:  
$2 million, 100 tons of 
pollution removed 
Harassment  
Compliance cost:  
$4 million, 125 tons of 
pollution removed 
Evade  Opportunism 
Compliance cost:  
$1 million, 50 tons of 
pollution removed 
Legalistic Battles 
Compliance cost:  
$3 million, 75 tons of 
pollution removed 
An agency that positions itself in rule-bound “deterrence mode” is 
unlikely to elicit cooperative behavior from firms because firms feel 
that the agency will take advantage of such behavior by forcing firms 
to go by the book and pay $4 million in compliance costs.239 Faced 
with an agency in such an enforcement posture, it is cheaper for a 
firm to skirt the law (evade) and spend only $3 million after engaging 
in legal battles.240 The result of these battles is that the agency will 
“win” some measure of compliance, but only to the extent of 75 tons 
of pollution removed. In contrast, if the agency could only recognize 
which firms truly were willing cooperators (even despite the 
occasional mistake), it could reciprocate (Tit-For-Tat) by itself 
showing flexibility and cooperative behavior. The result, which 
237. Id. at 60–61 (describing agency behavior as involving “legalistic battles”).
238. See id. (reproducing the Scholz enforcement dilemma).
239. Id. at 61 (describing a situation in which “the firm may cooperate by developing and
implementing innovative pollution-saving production techniques only to have the agency insist 
later that the legally required scrubber be installed as well” (quoting John T. Scholz, Deterrence, 
Cooperation, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179, 187 
(1984))). 
240. Id. at 62.
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Professor Scholz calls “voluntary” compliance,241 is actually better 
described, in Professor Axelrod’s terms, as “reciprocal” compliance. 
In this win-win scenario, the agency is rewarded with improved 
regulatory compliance (100 tons of pollution is removed), and the 
firm is rewarded with the flexibility to achieve this result at a cost of 
only $2 million.242 
There is, however, a rub. Professors Ayres and Braithwaite 
conclude that the very discretion that enables administrative agencies 
to consider reciprocal action simultaneously opens up opportunities 
for agencies to be “captured” by evasion-minded firms.243 Should that 
happen, then the two players of Scholz’s enforcement game would 
end up in the bottom-left quadrant, in which the firm successfully 
evades what would have been its legal obligations (and thus receives 
the cheater’s bonus of paying only $1 million in compliance costs) and 
the agency nonetheless cooperates by foregoing enforcement, leaving 
the public with the sucker’s payoff of a suboptimally low level of 
environmental quality (only 50 tons of pollution removed).244 
What is needed, therefore, is a mechanism to keep the regulators 
honest. Professors Ayres and Braithwaite suggest empowering 
another actor, citizen groups, in a system of “tripartism” in which 
such groups could punish regulators who deviated unjustifiably from 
a deterrence posture in the face of an evading firm.245 Law professor 
Cliff Rechtschaffen, who is skeptical of the collaborationists’ project, 
suggests both citizen suits and a “strict enforcement” regime in which 
agencies would be required to exact meaningful penalties from firms 
that failed to meet their promises.246 Professor Karkkainen proposes 
the use of regulatory penalty defaults that would take effect should 
parties not successfully bargain their way to a truly collaborative 
outcome.247 
241. See id. at 60–61 (labeling the cooperate-cooperate outcome as “voluntary
compliance”). 
242. Id.
243. See id. at 56 (“This then is the policy nut we seek to crack. How do we secure the
advantages of the evolution of cooperation while averting the evolution of capture and 
corruption?”). 
244. Id. at 63–64.
245. Id. at 71–98.
246. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 203, at 1267 (“In return for this freedom [to participate
in a program such as EPA’s “Project XL”], regulated entities should be held closely accountable 
for their promises.”). 
247. Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 965–69.
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the relative 
merits of these, or other, mechanisms that would be necessary for 
cooperation to emerge from collaborative regimes. Nonetheless, it 
bears emphasizing that, in a two-tiered regulatory system—whereby 
agencies systematically recognized and rewarded cooperative firms 
and punished defectors—one would expect firms and agencies to 
learn, over time, that flexibility and cooperation are always better 
than deterrence and defection. In his more recent works,248 Professor 
Axelrod uses a genetic algorithm to show how, under the right 
conditions, a “metanorm” of cooperation can spread among rational 
actors249 when they are embedded in a truly reciprocal environment in 
which punishment, as well as rewards, are predictable.250 That said, 
the fact that cooperation can emerge under these conditions hardly 
means that a unilateral shift by regulatory agencies toward 
“cooperative-only” postures should be expected to bring about 
improved regulatory compliance by firms. It is, after all, a reciprocal 
environment, and not simply a lenient environment, from which 
cooperation emerges in complex adaptive systems. Thus, it should 
come as little surprise that the empirical evidence on regulatory 
experiments that emphasize only leniency is mixed at best.251 
In the end, it is fair to conclude that insights from evolutionary 
game theory suggest, but do not establish, that regulatory strategies 
248. See AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14; AXELROD, supra note 11.
249. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 14, at 10–11; AXELROD, supra note 11, at 55. 
250. AXELROD, supra note 11, at 23 (finding, by using a genetic algorithm’s ability to select
successful behaviors over time, that “[a]s the reciprocators do well, they spread in the 
population, resulting in more and more cooperation and greater and greater effectiveness”); see 
also Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the 
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1997) (noting possible circumstances under 
which one norm will drive out a second). 
251. Compare Raymond J. Burby, Coercive Versus Cooperative Pollution Control:
Comparative Study of State Programs to Reduce Erosion and Sedimentation Pollution in Urban 
Areas, 19 ENVTL. MGMT. 359, 368 (1995) (finding that cooperative-only strategies by regulatory 
agencies were less effective than traditional deterrence strategies), and Cherly E. Wasserman, 
Federal Enforcement: Theory and Practice, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21, 30 
(T.H. Pietenberg ed., 1992) (finding that the EPA and the states were unsuccessful in bringing 
municipalities into compliance with the Clean Water Act using solely a compliance promotion 
approach), with Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 
YALE J. ON REG. 535, 559–60 (1996) (finding benefits from the Voluntary Protection Program 
of the Federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration) and John T. Scholz, 
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 115, 120, 128 (1991) (finding that increased cooperation by regulatory agencies 
can be measured by lower injury rates among workers). See generally Rechtschaffen, supra note 
229, at 15–20 nn.96–150 (collecting empirical studies and anecdotal evidence). 
960 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:913
can be developed to reap the benefits of cooperation between 
agencies and regulated firms. At this point, the emphasis should be 
not on the possibility that cooperation might emerge, but on the real-
world conditions that are necessary for the emergence of sustained 
cooperation. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor John Holland, one of the leading contemporary 
contributors to complexity theory, observes that “[w]e are 
everywhere confronted with emergence in complex adaptive 
systems—ant colonies, networks of neurons, the immune system, the 
Internet, and the global economy, to name a few, and that [t]here . . . . 
are deep questions about the human condition that depend on 
understanding the emergent properties of such systems.”252 Given the 
breadth of applications to which complexity theory has been applied, 
it is not difficult to conclude that law generally, and regulatory 
environments in particular, might share the tendencies of complex 
adaptive systems. The purpose of this Article is to argue not that 
complexity theory best explains the law, but rather that existing law 
and the claims made by legal reformers, can be evaluated more fully 
by attention to both the metaphors and mechanisms that complexity 
theory offers.  
252. HOLLAND, supra note 15, at 2.
